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This thesis studies the role of banks in the transmission of nominal shocks into credit 
markets in emerging countries. It builds on the lending channel hypothesis, which 
states that, due to imperfections in capital markets, banks may not be able to 
completely offset a negative shock to deposits with other sources of finance. As a 
result, they may choose to cut credit, affecting the financing possibilities of bank-
dependent firms and amplifying the effects of monetary shocks on economic activity.  
Empirical work on the lending channel in emerging countries is scarce. This 
thesis argues that, since the mechanism relies on the presence of imperfections in 
capital markets, it should be expected to be stronger in emerging countries. Therefore, 
looking at the cross-country evidence provides a source of variation that has not been 
previously exploited in the literature.  
The thesis is divided in three chapters. The first develops a model of the 
lending channel in a small open economy to study how differences in the severity 
capital market imperfections affect the power of the mechanism. The second takes of 
  
the model to the data, using a bank-level panel dataset of 832 banks in 27 countries 
during 1986-1998. The chapter tests for systematic cross-sectional differences in the 
response of loan growth to monetary conditions across banks of various characteristics 
and across developed and emerging countries. The third chapter further looks at the 
evidence from emerging markets, using differences in bank ownership to proxy for 
unobserved financial constraints facing banks. In particular, it builds on the 
presumption that foreign banks operating in emerging markets are less financially 
constrained than domestic. The test exploits a novel bank-level dataset comprising 
1565 banks in 20 emerging countries during 1989-2001, to look for systematic 
differences across domestic and foreign banks.  
The results obtained are supportive of the existence of a lending channel 
mechanism that is stronger in emerging countries. On the other hand, the behavior of 
domestic and foreign banks is not found to be markedly different, which may imply 
that foreign banks in emerging countries are prevented from freely resorting to 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
What is the role of banks in the transmission of nominal shocks into credit markets in 
developing countries? By now, there is a vast literature, grouped under the lending 
channel hypothesis, suggesting that banks play an active role in the transmission of 
monetary shocks into credit markets in the United States.1 In contrast, there is a 
surprisingly scarce amount of research using data from other countries, in particular 
from developing countries.2 This thesis is an attempt to fill this gap by providing a 
first pass at the international evidence. 
It is already well established by the Modigliani-Miller theorem that, in a setting 
of perfect capital markets, firms' investment decisions are independent from their 
financial structure. In this world, changes in the supply of credit by banks do not have 
any effect on the real economy. Banks are mere financial veils. However, a vast 
literature has questioned the practical relevance of this proposition for macroeconomic 
analysis.3 The basic hypothesis is that asymmetric information problems make 
financial markets incomplete. This opens the door for a large set of possible ways 
through which banks may play a non-trivial role in the functioning of the economy. 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Bernanke, and Blinder (1992), Bernanke B. and M. Gertler (1995), 
Kashyap and Stein (1995, 2000), Ashcraft (2000), Kishan and Opiela (2000). 
2 The few exceptions include a study on the transmission of monetary policy in 
emerging economies by the BIS (1998), and Edwards and Végh (1997), who study the 
role of banks in the transmission of nominal shocks in Mexico and Chile. Also, 
deBondt (1999) studies the lending channel in Europe, and Agung (1998) focuses on 
the case of Indonesia. 
3 See Brainard and Tobin (1963), Bernanke and Gertler (1987), Bernanke and Blinder 
(1988), Blinder and Stiglitz (1983), Kashyap and Stein (1995). 
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In the United States, it has been well documented that changes in monetary 
policy have an effect on aggregate bank lending volume. While this observation is 
consistent with the traditional money channel of monetary transmission, which states 
that changes in monetary policy have an effect on short-term interest rates and, 
through them, on the demand for bank credit, the apparent excess sensitivity of bank 
lending and output to monetary policy has driven economists to search for additional 
mechanisms through which policy-induced changes in short-term interest rates may be 
amplified. Along this line, a mechanism known as the lending channel, states that 
imperfections in capital markets may limit the capacity of banks to completely offset a 
policy-induced contraction of deposits with other sources of financing. As a result, a 
contraction in the supply of bank credit may result, affecting the financing possibilities 
of bank-dependent firms and amplifying the effects of monetary policy on economic 
activity. This effect may occur on top of the money channel, which operates through 
loan demand. 
To date, there is a large amount of empirical literature, mostly focused on the 
United States case, that tends to support this proposition. Most studies have found that 
banks identified a priori as more financially constrained tend to display a larger 
sensitivity of loan growth to monetary policy shocks. This evidence is consistent with 
the existence of loan supply effects, and has been frequently interpreted as supportive 
of the lending channel hypothesis. However, this interpretation has been contested, 
since the results are also consistent with the existence of systematic differences in loan 
demand across banks. In other words, there is an underlying identification problem 
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that has not been completely resolved: disentangling whether the observed movements 
in equilibrium bank credit are completely explained by changes in loan demand, as 
suggested by the money channel view, or if they can be partially attributed to changes 
in loan supply, as suggested by the lending channel hypothesis.  
This thesis argues that mixing bank-level evidence from countries with 
different levels of capital market development provides further insight into this 
problem. Since the lending channel mechanism relies on the existence of capital 
market imperfections, it should be expected to be stronger in countries with less 
developed capital markets. Therefore, comparing the response of bank credit to 
monetary conditions across countries with different levels of capital market 
development provides a source of variation that has not been exploited in the 
literature. This may be an alternative, albeit still imperfect, way to tackle the 
longstanding identification problem. 
Looking at the evidence from developing countries is also an end in itself. It 
has already been documented that firms operating in developing countries tend to be 
more dependent on bank financing (Rojas-Suarez and Weisbrod (1995)). Moreover, 
since small open economies are more vulnerable to changes in the conditions of 
international capital markets, understanding the role of the banking system in the 
transmission of these shocks into domestic credit markets, and the policy responses to 
ameliorate undesirable real effects, is an important objective. 
The dissertation is structured in three chapters. The first provides a theoretical 
framework to study the functioning of the lending channel in a small open economy. 
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Most of the existing theoretical models refer to the closed economy case,4 and 
therefore are not necessarily well suited for studying the mechanism in open 
economies. The model builds on previous theoretical results, but emphasizes the role 
of international capital markets and the foreign exchange market as potential sources 
of shocks to bank deposits. It also studies how differences in the degree of capital 
market imperfections—caused by differences in bankruptcy costs—affect the power of 
the mechanism. Since developing countries tend to have weaker accounting and legal 
systems, this setting provides a foundation for the cross-country analysis presented in 
the empirical part. 
The model shows that the sensitivity of bank credit to changes in monetary 
conditions tends to be larger for more financially constrained banks, which is a well 
known result in this literature. A novel, albeit intuitive, result is that banks paying 
higher interest rates on non-insured debt are shown to be more financially constrained. 
This sets the basis for looking into the effective cost of non-deposit debt as a proxy for 
unobserved financial constraints on banks. Finally, the model shows that the lending 
channel will tend to be stronger for banks operating under weaker bankruptcy regimes. 
Before continuing, three comments are convenient to place this thesis in 
context. First, while the literature on the lending channel focuses on the role of banks 
in the transmission of monetary policy into the credit market, this thesis takes a 
broader approach. It studies the effects of changes in monetary conditions on the credit 
market, regardless of whether these changes are induced, or not, by monetary policy. 
                                                 
4 For example, Bernanke and Blinder (1988), Kashyap and Stein (1995), Repullo and 
Suarez (1999), Ashcraft (2000). 
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This difference in emphasis is necessary. The lending channel literature has mostly 
focused on the channels of monetary policy transmission in the United States, and 
therefore refers to policy-induced shocks to deposits. Conversely, this thesis studies 
emerging markets, where monetary policy is typically constrained by an open capital 
account. 
Second, the lending channel literature ignores the role of the external sector as 
a potential source of instability to bank deposits, which is natural considering that the 
United States is a relatively closed economy. In contrast, by focusing on emerging 
markets, the role of the external sector comes to the front. Thus, monetary conditions 
here not only include money market rates, as usual in the lending channel literature, 
but also international interest rates, and the change of the foreign exchange rate. The 
justification for the latter is straightforward, since currency depreciation increases the 
opportunity cost of holding bank deposits denominated in local currency, which 
directly affects the stability of bank reserves. In fact, the uncovered interest parity 
postulates a benchmark relationship between local interest rates, international interest 
rates, and the exchange rate, which is exploited here. 
Third, monetary conditions also include reserve requirements, which are safely 
ignored in the lending channel literature since they are not longer used as a monetary 
policy tool in the United States. In contrast, reserve requirements still are used as a 




Going now into the empirical part, the second chapter uses a bank-level panel 
database (balance sheets, income statements, and cash flows) for a sample of 832 
banks in 27 countries (both developed and emerging) during 1986-1998, and tests the 
implications of the model. As mentioned before, the testing strategy exploits the idea 
that the lending channel—if it exists—should be stronger in countries with less 
developed capital markets. The exercise uses panel regressions with bank-level fixed 
effects, to test for systematic differences in the response of bank credit to monetary 
conditions across banks of different characteristics, and across banks operating in 
developed versus developing countries. 
The results support the idea that banks play an active role in the transmission 
of monetary conditions into the credit market, and that the channel is stronger in 
developing countries. In particular, loan growth of banks operating in developing 
countries is more sensitive to changes in monetary conditions, and bigger banks are 
more capable of isolating loan growth from changes in monetary conditions, 
particularly in developing countries. An additional exercise indicates that loan growth 
of banks paying higher effective interest rates on non-deposit debt is more sensitive to 
changes in monetary conditions, particularly in developing countries. These results 
hold when the sample is restricted to non-US banks, and to episodes of exchange rate 
depreciation below 25 percent per year (the maximum for the developed countries in 




The third chapter further looks at the evidence from emerging countries, 
exploiting both an alternative identification strategy and data. Typically, empirical 
work on the lending channel is based on sample partitions between banks classified 
ex-ante as more financially constrained, and a group that serves as a control. Since 
financial constraints are not directly observable, in practice these have been usually 
proxied by observable bank characteristics such as size, liquidity and capitalization. 
This chapter follows a different route. It takes advantage of the large increase in 
foreign bank participation in emerging countries during the 1990s and exploits 
differences in bank ownership (i.e. domestic versus foreign) to proxy for financial 
constraints. The idea of using ownership to proxy for financial constraints is not new 
but has not been previously applied in this way.5 To implement this idea, the chapter 
uses a panel of 1565 banks in 20 Asian and Latin American countries during 1989-
2001, and keeps track of the evolution of bank ownership by mixing current 
shareholders information with a comprehensive database on mergers and acquisitions. 
The chapter tests for systematic differences in the sensitivity of loan and deposit 
growth to various measures of monetary conditions, across domestic and foreign 
banks. It also looks for systematic differences in the response of bank-specific lending 
and deposit rates to monetary conditions across domestic and foreign banks. As an 
additional exercise, the chapter further explores differences in the behavior of 
domestic and foreign banks during normal times and periods of financial distress, 
exploiting various definitions of banking and currency crises available in the literature. 
                                                 
5 See for example, Houston et al. (1997), Ashcraft (2000), Peek and Rosengren (1997). 
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The results indicate that the response of loans and deposits to monetary conditions is 
similar across domestic and foreign banks. In particular, periods of tighter monetary 
conditions are associated with lower loan and deposit growth, especially for domestic 
banks, but differences tend to be weak. The results also show that differences in the 
sensitivity of loan growth to monetary conditions across domestic and foreign banks 
are driven by banks with lower capitalization and/or asset liquidity. At the same time, 
the behavior of domestic and foreign banks is roughly similar during tranquil periods 
and during periods of financial distress. If any, differences across domestic and 
foreign banks appear to be more closely related to the behavior of interest rates. In 
particular, lending and deposit rates of foreign banks display a lower sensitivity to 
monetary conditions, and they also react smoothly during periods of financial distress, 
suggesting that foreign banks are in better position to attract deposits. Combined, the 
results presented in the third chapter only provide weak evidence in support of the 
lending channel hypothesis. 
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Chapter 2: The Lending Channel in a Small Open Economy 
This chapter develops a basic framework to study the lending channel in a small open 
economy. The model builds on the results of previous theoretical work and in fact 
differs more in emphasis than in substance.6 
Departures from existing models concentrate in three aspects. First, previous 
models refer to the closed economy case. Consequently, they ignore the role of 
international capital markets and the foreign exchange market as potential sources of 
shocks to bank deposits, and focus on the role of monetary policy in the credit market. 
For the purposes of this thesis, which deals with the lending channel in small open 
economies, the importance of international capital markets and foreign exchange 
markets as potential sources of shocks to bank deposits comes to the forefront. 
Therefore, the model explicitly considers the role of the international interest rates and 
the exchange rate as potential sources of shocks to bank deposits. 
Second, most previous models do not explicitly consider the role of reserve 
requirements in the transmission mechanism. In contrast, the model presented here 
explicitly introduces reserve requirements as a monetary policy tool, given its 
relevance for the empirical section (during the nineties, reserve requirements were 
actively used in most developing countries). In fact, the model shows that the power of 
                                                 
6 See for example Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Bernanke and Blinder (1988), Fuerst 
(1992, 1993), Stein (1995) Kashyap and Stein (1995), Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), 
and Repullo and Suarez (1999). 
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the lending channel mechanism directly depends on the tax-like effect of reserve 
requirements. 
Third, to provide a basis for the cross-country analysis that follows, the model 
illustrates how differences in bankruptcy costs—that could originate from underlying 
differences in the institutional setting across countries—shape the power of the 
mechanism. 
The model studies a partial equilibrium setting in a small open economy with 
three agents: banks, firms, and households. Banks provide liquidity to firms, in the 
form of loans, and to households, in the form of insured deposits. In addition, banks 
can issue non-insured debt (a domestic bond), which can be purchased by international 
investors. Deposits and bonds differ in two aspects. First, deposits are insured and 
subject to reserve requirements, while bonds are not. Second, deposits can be used to 
pay for transactions while bonds do not render liquidity services. The model is similar 
to Edwards and Végh (1997) in that banks are price takers both in the loan and deposit 
markets, but departs from them by allowing for imperfect substitutability between the 
domestic bond and a risk-free international asset. Imperfect substitutability is 
introduced using a costly state verification setup (Townsend (1978), Gale and Hellwig 
(1985), Williamson (1987)). 
To introduce an asymmetric information problem between banks and 
bondholders, banks are subject to uncertain operating costs that affect the net returns 
of their loan portfolio. The probability distribution of the operating costs is known by 
all market participants, but the particular realizations (and therefore the ex-post returns 
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on the loan portfolio) are observed at no cost only by banks. All other agents must pay 
a cost to verify the net return on loans. Under non-negative liabilities, banks declare 
bankruptcy if their return on assets is insufficient to cover their average cost of funds. 
In that event, bondholders must pay a bankruptcy cost that reduces their recovered 
value. This produces an excess return on bank bonds over the risk-free rate, to 
compensate bondholders for the event of bank bankruptcy, even under universal risk 
neutrality. Under this setup, the slope of the marginal cost of bond financing increases 
with bankruptcy costs. 
The funding mix of banks is determined as follows. Deposits are the preferred 
(cheapest) source of bank financing since they are insured and render a liquidity 
service. In fact, in equilibrium, interest rates on deposits are lower than the risk-free 
interest rate. Now, if for some reason If for some reason deposits are not enough to 
finance loan opportunities, banks resort to bond financing, increasing the average cost 
of bank funds and therefore their probability of bankruptcy. Thus, the contractual 
return on bonds goes up with the amount of bond financing. With this result, the 
model produces imperfect substitution between insured deposits and non-insured debt, 
which is a well known necessary condition for the existence of a lending channel. 
Comparative static exercises are used to study the effects of changes in 
monetary conditions (measured by exchange rate depreciation, international interest 
rates, and reserve requirements) on equilibrium loans. The model shows that a 
tightening in monetary conditions translates into a decrease in equilibrium loans via 
both loan demand and supply effects. Similarly, a tightening in monetary conditions 
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leads to an increase in both deposit rates and lending minus deposit spreads. Finally, 
the model shows that banks paying higher interest on non-insured debt are more 
financially constrained, which provides an alternative way to proxy for unobservable 
financial constraints facing banks in the empirical section that follows. All these 
effects are shown to be more pronounced for larger bankruptcy costs. Therefore, under 
the presumption that developing countries have weaker bankruptcy procedures and 
legal systems, this result provides the basis for the cross-country comparison presented 
in the empirical part. 
The rest of the chapter is as follows. The first section presents the setup of the 
model. Section two performs comparative static exercises for the case of perfect 
capital markets, and section three studies the case of imperfect capital markets. 
A Model of the Lending Channel in a Small Open Economy 
The framework presented here uses a reduced from approach. Consider a two period 
small open economy freely integrated with the rest of the world in both goods and 
capital markets. By the law of one price, the domestic price index, used as a 
numeraire, is given by P=EP*, where E stands for the exchange rate and P* for the 
foreign price index. The economy is populated by a continuum of infinitely-many 
price-taker banks located on [0,1]. The role of banks is to provide liquidity services 
both to firms, in the form of loans, and to households, in the form of demand deposits. 
The components of bank balance sheets are as follows. On the assets side, they hold 
reserves, h, and loans, z. On the liabilities side, they issue insured deposits, d, and non-
insured debt (or bonds), b. In addition, banks are endowed with k ],0[ k∈  units of 
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internal capital at the beginning of period 0. Deposits and bonds differ in two 
dimensions. First, deposits are used to pay for transactions (i.e. they render a liquidity 
service), while bonds do not. Second, deposits are insured by a government agency 
and subject to reserve requirements of δ per unit of deposits, while bonds are not. 
Interest rates are as follows. Loans pay a real (gross) rate Rl(=Il-π*-ε), where Il 
is the (gross) nominal rate on loans, π* is the foreign inflation rate, and ε is the 
depreciation of the exchange rate. Similarly, Id and I are the (gross) nominal rates on 
deposits and bonds, respectively. Banks face the same loan and deposit rates, which 
they take as given, while bond interest rates are bank-specific. 
There is universal risk neutrality and the bond market is open to international 
investors, who invest in the bank's bond, b, as long as its expected gross return equals 
the international interest rate converted into local currency I*(=R*+π*+ε). 
To introduce uncertainty on bank assets, assume that loans are risk-free, but 
that running a bank requires paying an uncertain end-of-period cost c, with mean c , 
per unit of loans. Thus, the ex-post nominal return on bank loans is g=Il-c. The 
realization of c is observed at no cost only by banks. All other agents must pay a cost 
to verify the ex-post return on bank loans. This captures the costly state verification 
setup due to Townsend (1978), Gale and Hellwig (1985), and Williamson (1987). 
Under this assumption, it is well established that if bondholders cannot commit to a 
stochastic monitoring technology, then the optimal contract between bondholders and 
banks will have all the characteristics of a standard debt contract, where banks pay the 
contractual interest rate on bonds I if they stay in business; otherwise bondholders take 
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over bank assets after paying the monitoring (bankruptcy) costs. Following this, 
assume that in the event of bankruptcy, bondholders receive a fraction of the promised 
bond return (1-γ)I, where ]1,0[∈γ  are bankruptcy costs per unit invested. Denoting by 
]1,0[∈q  the probability of bank bankruptcy, the bondholders participation constraint 
is given by *)1()1( IIqqI ≥−+−γ . In words, the expected return on bonds cannot be 
lower than the international interest rate expressed in local currency. The gross interest 
rate on bonds can be expressed as: 










 is the contractual interest spread on bank bonds (or bond 
spread) that compensates bondholders for the event of banks going bankrupt. 
Following from the observation that debt yields tend to increase with debt to equity 
ratios of the borrowing institutions (see for example Steigum (1983)), assume that the 
probability of default is an increasing function of the bond to equity ratio, that is: 












'' . In words, the function is frre to be convex, linear, or concave in b, 
provided it is not too concave. Further assume that the function f satisfies the 







For banks, the total cost of bond financing is I(γ,b/k)b, and the marginal cost 
m(.)=I(γ,b/k)+φbb. Under the previous assumptions, the marginal cost is increasing in 
the level of outstanding bonds, that is, mb(.)=2φb+φbbb >0. Also, it is easy to check that 
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φ(0,b/k)=0, φ(γ,0)=0, φb>0, φbγ>0, φbk<0. In words, for a given level of capital, the bond 
spread is increasing in the amount of outstanding bonds. In addition, the bond spread 
increases with bankruptcy costs and decreases with bank capital. Clearly, in absence 
of bankruptcy costs the bond spread is zero. This is the setup considered in Romer and 
Romer (1990) where banks are able to freely substitute deposits with bond financing 
without incurring any additional cost. Below, this case will be used as a benchmark, 
and labeled as the "perfect capital markets case". It is important to note the asymmetry 
between bondholders and banks with respect to the interest on bonds. Since 
bondholders are risk-neutral, the expected return on bonds is equal to the international 
interest rate. On the other hand, from the bank's perspective, the bond spread 
introduces a real gap between the risk free interest rate and the cost of bond financing, 
since the relevant comparison for them is conditional on staying in business. 
Consider now the banks' problem. Banks take the loan and deposit rates as 





,      (2) 
subject to the bondholder's participation constraint (1), the balance sheet constraint: 
kbdzh ++=+ ,        (3) 
and the reserve requirements. In equilibrium, the interest rate charged to loans will be 
higher than the opportunity cost of money. Therefore, excess reserves are always zero 







l IcI         (4) 
bIcI l '* φφ ++=−         (5) 
 
These two equations give the equilibrium (cost-minimizing) relationship that must 
hold between lending, deposit, and bond rates. Equation (4) indicates that the (net) 
return on loans has to be equal to the effective rate paid on deposits, after taking into 
account the extra cost implied by the reserve requirements. Equation (5) further 
equates the (net) return on loans to the marginal cost of bond financing. In the case of 
perfect capital markets, the last two terms in the right hand side of (5) collapse to zero 
and the interest rate on loans will be equalized to the international interest rate plus the 
operating costs of banks. Notice that, for an internal solution (with both deposit and 
bond financing), the equilibrium deposit rate (inclusive of the opportunity cost of 







In what follows the paper will focus in this case.7 These two equations can be 
rewritten to define the loan supply and deposit demand by banks. Letting F(.)=φ+φbb 
gives: 
                                                 
7 In fact, notice that the equilibrium interest rate on deposits (inclusive of the 
opportunity cost of holding the required reserves) cannot be lower than the 






). In this case, 
banks will choose not to issue bonds but finance their loans exclusively through 
deposit issuance. Furthermore, banks will find optimal to issue deposits in excess of 
their loan demand and acquire international bonds, which will tend to increase 




ckbFII l +=− )/,(* γ        (4’) 
)/,()1()( ** kbFcIII d γδδ −−+=−      (5’) 
Equation (4’) is the loan supply by banks. In the case of perfect capital markets (γ=0), 
F(.) collapses to zero and the difference between the lending rate and the international 
rate (the lending spread) boils down to a constant ( c ). On the other hand, under 
capital market imperfections, the lending spread becomes an increasing function of the 
level of bond financing. 
Equation (5’) is the deposit demand by banks. Again, in the perfect capital 
markets case, the second term in the right hand side disappears and the difference 
between the international rate and the deposit rate (the deposit spread) becomes 
constant. In the presence of capital market imperfections, the deposit spread decreases 
with the level of bond financing (i.e. deposit rates become closer to the risk-free 
international rate). The reason is that by cost minimization, the equilibrium deposit 
rate goes up with the bond spread. Notice also that the deposit spread cannot be 
negative. As deposits are insured, there will be an infinite supply of deposits at the 
risk-free international rate. Accordingly, equation (5’) implicitly defines a maximum 
amount of bond financing for each bank. In general, banks facing steeper marginal 
costs of bond financing will have a lower equilibrium level of bonds and a lower size 
in equilibrium. Based on this, the empirical section uses bank size as a proxy for 
financial restrictions facing banks. 
To ease aggregation and close the model in the simplest way, assume that all 
banks have an equal endowment of capital and that the supply of deposits decreases 
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linearly in the opportunity cost of holding deposits (i.e., the difference between the 
interest rate on deposits and the international rate, or deposit spread). 
)( *10
dIIddd −−=         (6) 
Similarly, assume that the demand for bank loans is a linear function of the real rate of 




l −−−=        (7) 
Equation (7) encompasses the traditional money channel and the bank lending 
channel. If banks are able to freely offset shocks to deposits with non-insured debt 
financing, the lending spread (Il-I*) collapses to a constant ( c ) and the equilibrium in 
the credit market (equations (4’) and (7)) depends solely on the international interest 
rate. In this case, higher interest rates discourage the demand for bank loans, as 
suggested by the money view. On the other hand, if banks face an upward sloping 
supply curve of non-insured debt financing, then the lending spread becomes positive 
and an additional loan supply mechanism enters into action. The assumption that 
banks operating in developing countries face stronger restrictions on non-insured debt 
financing provides a fundamental source of variation across countries for the empirical 
section. 
This concludes the model. The equilibrium entails solving the system of 
equations (1), (3), (4’), (5’), (6), and (7), on six unknowns: deposits, bonds, loans, and 
                                                 




the interest spreads (lending-, deposit-, and bond-spreads). The next section presents 
comparative static results in the perfect capital markets case. 
Benchmark case: equilibrium under perfect capital markets 
Plugging equation (4’) into (7) gives the equilibrium in the loan market, which in the 
case of perfect capital markets becomes 
)( *10 cRzzz +−=         (8) 
Similarly, plugging equation (5’) into (6) gives the equilibrium in the deposit market 
 )*(10 cIddd +−= δ         (9) 
Equations (8) and (9) imply: 
Result 1: In the perfect capital markets case, the credit market is isolated from 
changes in currency depreciation or in required reserves. 
This result falls directly from equations (8) and (9). Recalling that I*=R*+π*+ε, 
then an increase in exchange depreciation increases the opportunity costs of holding 
bank deposits, and reduces equilibrium deposits. Nevertheless, banks isolate the credit 
market by substituting bond for deposit financing. A similar result holds for changes 
in required reserves. Note also that an increase in the real international rate reduces 
equilibrium loans only by affecting the demand for bank loans. This is the money 
channel mechanism. 
Equilibrium under imperfect capital markets 
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Accordingly, in the imperfect capital markets case, the level of bond financing affects 
the equilibrium levels of loans and deposits. Using equations (1), (3), (10) and (11), it 
is easy to show that under imperfect capital markets, an increase in depreciation or in 
required reserves affects the credit market via a change the loan supply (an increase in 
the loan spread). More specifically, 
Result 2: Under imperfect capital markets, an increase in currency depreciation, or in 
required reserves, increases the lending spread (Il-I*), and reduces the equilibrium 
level of loans. In addition, the lending-minus-deposit spread (Il-Id), goes up, and the 
deposit spread (I*-Id) goes down. 
Proof: See Appendix. 
The intuition behind this result is straightforward. An increase in currency 
depreciation increases the opportunity cost of holding bank deposits. As banks try to 
substitute deposit financing for bond financing, by equation (1) the bond spread (I-I*) 
goes up. Given that I*(=R*+π*+ε) is increasing, this implies that the bond rate has to 
increase more than proportionally. By cost minimization, equilibrium deposit rates 
must increase by more than I* and thus the deposit spread goes down. Finally, the 
increase in the average cost of funds to banks translates into the credit market, 
producing a contraction in the loan supply and equilibrium lending. Similar effects 
arise in response to an increase in required reserves. 
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Note that the response of interest rates implies that lending-minus-deposit 
spreads should display a positive correlation with exchange rate depreciation, 
particularly in countries with less developed capital markets. Evidence of this is 
provided in the next section. 
As an additional exercise, it is easy to see that an increase in the international 
real interest rate has two effects on the loan market. First, there is an effect on loan 
demand, similar to the perfect capital markets case considered above. Second, on top 
of that, there is a reduction in loan supply that further lowers equilibrium loans. This is 
the lending channel mechanism. 
Before going into the empirical part, note that the effects of monetary 
conditions on the loan market are expected to be stronger for banks facing a steeper 
marginal cost curve of bond financing. This provides a basis for looking at differences 
across banks of different sizes, and across developed and developing countries. An 
additional source of cross sectional variation is provided in the next result. 
Result 3: A decrease in bankruptcy costs increases the equilibrium level of bond 
financing, and lowers the equilibrium bond spread. 
Proof: See Appendix. 
The first part of this statement does not require any comment. The second 
implies that banks facing steeper marginal costs of bond financing will also have 
higher bond rates in equilibrium. This provides an additional test for the empirical part 
that follows, since it implies that it is possible to use the interest rates on bonds as a 
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measure of financial constraints on banks. The next chapter takes the implications of 
this model to the data. 
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Chapter 3: A Look at the International Evidence 
This chapter takes the main results of the model to the data using panel regressions 
with fixed effects at the bank level. The idea is to test whether the sensitivity of loan 
growth to monetary conditions varies systematically across banks and among groups 
of countries. In particular, the following specification is used: 
 +++++=∆ 3,,,2,,1,,, βββµ tcitctcitctitci xzxzdLoans  
  tictcitcctcictc DxzDxDz ,6,,,5,,4, εβββ ++++  
Where i=1,...,N, c=1,...,C, and t=1,...,T. Here N is the number of banks in the sample, 
C is the number of countries, and T is the maximum number of periods. The sample is 
unbalanced, so the number of observations varies across banks. The left-hand side 
variable, ∆Loansi,c,t, represents the first difference of the log of loans in constant 
(1995) local currency.9 The model is specified in growth rates, as customary in the 
literature, to account for the autocorrelation of loans.  
The vector zc,t includes country-specific variables, i.e., variables that are 
common across banks operating in the same country. Data sources for the macro 
variables are the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, and the International 
Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics (IFS). In particular, GDP GROWTH, 
the yearly growth rate of the gross domestic product, is included to control for the 
potential effects of the business cycle on loan demand. In order to provide a test of the 
theoretical framework above, the vector zc,t also includes four measures of monetary 
                                                 
9 Loan growth was also measured in constant US$ to check robustness, with results 
similar to those reported in this chapter. 
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conditions. The first, DEPRECIATION, is computed as first difference of the log of the 
yearly average of the market exchange rate (series rf of the IFS). The second, MONEY 
MARKET RATE, is the yearly average interest rate for short-term borrowings between 
financial institutions (line 60b of the IFS). The third, RESERVE REQUIREMENTS, is an 
indicator variable that reflects the evolution of required reserves. This indicator ranges 
from 1 to 3, where a higher value means higher levels of required reserves. The 
indicator is based on Reinhart and Reinhart (1999) and Kaminsky and Schmukler 
(2001).10 The fourth measure of monetary conditions, TREASURY BILL RATE, is the 
rate of US Treasury Bills (line 60c of the IFS). This is included to account for 
international interest rates.11 Of course, this variable is common to all countries. 
The vector xi,c,t includes three bank-specific variables intended to capture cross-
sectional differences in the degree of liquidity constraints that banks are facing. The 
first, LAGGED LIQUIDITY, is computed as the sum of cash and liquid investments12 over 
total assets at the end of the previous fiscal year. The rationale here is that banks with 
more liquid assets are in better position to offset an exogenous contraction in deposits 
without cutting their loan's portfolio, and therefore should be better prepared to isolate 
loan growth from changes in monetary conditions.  
                                                 
10 I am indebted to Graciela Kaminsky and Sergio Schmukler for sharing their data on 
required reserves. 
11 Regressions were also performed using the LIBOR (series 11260EA of the IFS) 
with results similar to those reported here. 
12 Liquid investments include financial assets such as stocks, bonds and other 
marketable securities, treasury bills, short-term government obligations, municipal 
securities, and mutual fund shares. 
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The second, LOG ASSETS, is the log of bank assets (in 1995 US$). The model 
above suggests that smaller banks face steeper marginal costs of non-insured debt 
financing, and thus should be less able to isolate loan growth from changes in 
monetary conditions. In fact, studies on the lending channel in the United States show 
ample evidence that the size of the bank is related to its ability to raise non-insured 
debt. A widely used strategy makes use of indicator variables to group banks of 
similar sizes. Here, the use of a continuous variable is somewhat more stringent. 
The third variable, DUMMY COST OF DEBT, is used to identify banks facing 
higher costs of non-deposit debt in a given year. For each bank-year, WorldScope 
reports interest expenses on non-deposit debt. Dividing this over total non-deposit debt 
at the beginning of the period gives an estimate of the average effective interest rate on 
non-insured debt at the bank level. As the nominal cost of debt differs across countries 
as well as over time, depending on macro conditions, the dummy compares the costs 
of non-insured debt between banks operating in the same country and on a yearly 
basis. In particular, DUMMY COST OF DEBT equals one if the effective rate on non-
insured debt of a bank in a given year is above the 75th percentile of the effective rates 
paid by all banks operating in the same country-year. According to the model above, 
banks facing higher effective rates of non-insured debt are expected to have a higher 
sensitivity of loan growth to monetary conditions. 
To test for cross-sectional differences, the bank-specific variables included in 
the vector xi,c,t are interacted with the monetary conditions in vector zc,t. The model 
above implies that bigger banks, and banks facing lower costs of non-deposit 
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financing, should be more able to isolate loan growth from changes in monetary 
conditions. This is a test commonly used in the lending channel literature, as well as in 
the credit channel literature. The present exercise goes a step further, by splitting the 
sample across groups of countries with the help of a dummy variable, Dc, that equals 
one for countries classified as low- or medium-income according to the World Bank 
(i.e., developing countries), and zero otherwise. This variable is interacted with the 
country- and bank-specific variables, as well as with the interaction between these two 
variables. 
A time trend is represented by dt, and µi stands for the bank-specific constant 
or fixed effect, which is assumed to be invariant over time. In all regressions 
performed, the Hausman test rejected the random effects specification. The error term 
εi,t is assumed to have the usual properties (mean zero, serially uncorrelated, 
uncorrelated with the exogenous variables, and homoskedastic). 
Data 
The exercise uses bank-level data from Worldscope. The available information, 
presented in Table 1, comprises balance sheets, income statements and flow of funds 
for 832 banks in 27 countries (both developed and developing) during the 1986-1998 
period. The sample is unbalanced, resulting in 6,648 balance sheets and income 
statements, and 3,748 cash flows gathered from the primary source. Worldscope 
reports both original data as published by the bank, as well as standardized figures that 
are adjusted to account for cross-country variations in accounting practices. 
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According to the source, the database includes only publicly traded banks with 
large market capitalization. This raises two concerns regarding bank size. The first is 
that one may expect a tendency of bigger banks to be located in developed countries, 
so the comparisons between bank sizes may mask cross-country differences. On the 
other hand, as the Worldscope sample is skewed towards publicly traded banks with 
large market capitalization, it introduces a bias against the hypothesis being tested, 
since small, non-listed banks are likely to be the ones facing higher liquidity 
constraints. In other words, the sample used in this chapter limits the power of the test. 
It may fail to detect differences in behavior across bank sizes, even if those differences 
are present for the whole population of banks. 
The sample distribution by quintiles of bank sizes for both developed and 
developing countries is presented in Table 2. The cut-off values that separate the 
quintiles of bank size are defined using the asset distribution of the whole sample, 
measured in constant 1995 US$. Banks are allowed to jump across size categories, but 
a filter is used to try to eliminate years in which a merger or acquisition may be under 
way. Specifically, all observations showing a variation in total assets greater than 50 
percent in absolute value between two consecutive years are eliminated from the 
sample. According to this criterion, 128 observations are deleted. It is apparent that 
median assets in each category are similar across developed and developing countries, 
with the exception of the fifth quintile, where the median assets of banks operating in 
developed countries almost double the median assets of banks operating in developing 
countries. Also, as should be expected, developed countries tend to represent a higher 
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proportion of the sample in the upper quintiles of bank size, although the difference is 
moderate. Most likely, the similarities in the distribution of bank sizes across 
developed and developing countries are a consequence of sample selection bias and 
not a reflection of true similarities in the population of banks. Again, this bias goes 
contrary to the hypothesis of the lending channel being stronger in developing 
countries, since the under-representation of smaller banks is expected to be greater in 
developing counties. 
Table 3 presents the median structure of bank balance sheets across developed 
and developing countries by quintiles of bank size. Several regularities are apparent. 
For the total sample, larger banks tend to have a lower proportion of their assets in 
liquid assets (cash and total investments in securities). This has been documented in 
previous studies using data for the United States (Kashyap and Stein, 1995) and 
interpreted as consistent with the hypothesis of smaller banks facing higher liquidity 
constraints (so they optimally decide to hold a buffer stock of liquid assets). By far, 
loans are the most important component of bank assets, accounting for roughly ⅔ of 
total assets. Fixed assets represent a very small proportion of total assets (generally 
less than 2 percent), and decrease steadily with bank size. This stands in sharp contrast 
with non-financial firms, where fixed assets typically represent a much larger 
proportion of total assets. 
On the liabilities side, total deposits are roughly the same size as loans, with 
smaller banks having lower loan to deposit ratios. This is also consistent with a story 
of buffer stocks being held by smaller banks. In addition, larger banks tend to rely 
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more on non-secured debt financing, and less on deposits and equity. This pattern, also 
documented in previous studies, is consistent with differences in market access to non-
secured debt across banks of different sizes. In particular, if smaller banks face higher 
marginal costs of issuing non-secured debt, they will optimally choose to have a lower 
proportion of debt financing in equilibrium. Note also that the magnitude of cash 
flows relative to loans decreases steadily with bank size and is very small (lower than 
3 percent). This suggests that the role of cash flows in the financing of loans is 
irrelevant, again standing in sharp contrast with the case of non-financial firms, which 
tend to rely on retained earnings to finance investment. 
Similar regularities emerge by looking across groups of countries. Banks 
operating in developing countries tend to have fewer loans relative to assets, and 
appear to be systematically more capitalized. Flows from operation relative to loans 
are also higher in developing countries, and decrease with bank size. This feature 
suggests the existence of systematic differences in the structure of bank's balance 
sheets across bank sizes, and between developed and developing economies. In 
particular, banks in developing countries seem to have a more liquid asset structure, 
and to rely less on non-insured debt financing. 
Descriptive Evidence from Aggregate Data 
In order to provide some preliminary evidence, it is convenient to take a look at the 
co-movements of interest spreads, loan and deposit growth, and exchange rate 
depreciation between groups of countries. The model above provides testable 
implications regarding the effects of monetary conditions on interest spreads, and loan 
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and deposit growth. Table 4 presents pair-wise correlations on selected variables based 
on yearly information for the period 1986-1998. The sample excludes the United 
States (given that depreciation is defined against the US$), as well as episodes of 
exchange rate depreciation above 25 percent (the largest depreciation for the 
developed countries in the sample). Nevertheless, the results presented here hold for 
the whole sample. The correlations are divided across developed and developing 
countries in order to highlight differences among groups of countries with different 
levels of capital market development. 
The list of variables includes the yearly rate of loan and deposit growth for 
each country, based on the median of the sampled banks, and various series taken 
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database: interest rates 
(lending and deposit), interest spreads (lending-minus-deposit and lending-minus-
LIBOR), and exchange rate depreciation. All these are yearly averages, which is more 
appropriate, since bank-level data are point figures taken at the end of the fiscal year 
for each bank, so they tend to be distributed throughout the calendar year. All growth 
rates are computed as the difference in the logarithms of the variables, expressed in 
constant 1995 local currency. Growth rates were also computed in constant US$ but 
results are not reported here. The resulting correlations show similar patterns in both 
cases. 
The results reveal important differences in the co-movements of the series 
across developed and developing countries. Consider first depreciation and interest 
rates. In developed countries, currency depreciation is not correlated with interest 
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spreads, and shows a low negative correlation with lending and deposit rates in levels. 
In contrast, in developing countries, currency depreciation shows a correlation close to 
one both with interest spreads, and with lending and deposit rates in levels. A similar 
pattern arises when looking at the relationship between deposit rates and lending-
minus-deposit spreads. 
These results are consistent with the model presented above. Currency 
depreciation induces a substitution of non-insured debt for deposit finance , increasing 
the external finance premium facing banks, particularly in countries with less 
developed capital markets. By cost minimization, equilibrium deposit rates have to 
increase, and this translates into the loan market through a reduction in the supply of 
loans. Of course, there may be other explanations. For example, suppose that currency 
depreciation is perceived as a once-and-for-all adjustment in developed countries, 
while regarded as a sign of further instability in developing economies. If this is the 
case, the high correlation between lending-minus-deposit spreads and currency 
depreciation may indicate that the risk attached to the projects being financed by bank 
loans increases with currency depreciation. Moreover, these correlations may also 
reflect a reverse causality. Suppose that for some unspecified reason, projects in 
developing countries become riskier. Interest spreads will increase and capital will 
flow out of the country, inducing currency depreciation. Trying to disentangle the 
mechanisms operating behind these empirical regularities is beyond the scope of this 
chapter. For now, it suffices to note that the co-movements are consistent with the 
hypothesis being tested.  
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Turning to deposit growth, similar differences across groups of countries 
emerge. In developed countries, deposit growth commoves positively with deposit 
interest rates, implying an expansion in the deposit demand by banks in periods of 
high deposit rates (and vice-versa). On the contrary, in developing countries the 
correlation between deposit growth and deposit interest rates is negative, implying that 
periods of high deposit rates are dominated by a contraction in the deposit supply. 
Taking together this and the correlations between depreciation and deposit rates, 
suggests that periods of high depreciation are accompanied by a contraction in deposit 
supply, as implied by the model. Moreover, the correlation between loan growth and 
lending interest rates is negative in developing countries, implying that periods of low 
loan growth are dominated by a contraction in the supply of bank loans. In contrast, 
the correlation of loan growth with lending rates and lending spreads in developed 
countries is not statistically significant. 
Finally, the correlation between deposit growth and loan growth in developing 
countries is close to one (0.97) and more than twice the corresponding figure for 
developed countries (0.41). This is also consistent with a lending channel being 
stronger in developing countries, because it suggests that loan growth is less isolated 
from deposit growth in these countries. 
Overall, the picture that emerges from these simple correlations is consistent 
with a lending channel being stronger in developing economies and suggests that there 
are remarkable differences in the behavior of interest spreads, depreciation, and bank 
credit across groups of countries. In particular, it suggests that loan and deposit supply 
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shocks predominate demand shocks in developing economies, and that depreciation is 
an important supply shock. Further research exploiting the time series properties of 
these variables is left for future work. The next section provides evidence from bank-
level data. 
Evidence from Bank-Level Data 
In order to describe the behavior of loan growth and deposit growth across banks, 
Table 5 presents summary statistics on these two variables. Growth rates are computed 
as the yearly difference of the logs in constant (1995) local currency. The sample is 
divided between banks operating in developed and developing countries, and further 
divided into two categories according to the costs of non-deposit debt financing facing 
banks. In particular, a bank-year is classified as "HIGH-COST-DEBT", if its effective 
interest rate on non-deposit debt is above the average for the corresponding country-
year, and classified as "LOW-COST-DEBT" in the opposite case. 
Panel A shows the summary statistics taken over the whole sample. In general, 
banks operating in developing countries have higher average rates of loan and deposit 
growth, and the series are also less stable. Comparing within country groups, loan 
growth of high-cost banks is lower than loan growth of low-cost banks both in 
developed and developing countries. Moreover, deposit growth is not significantly 
different across these two groups. The latter result is important, since it suggest that 
loan demand does not substantially differ across high- and low-cost banks, which is an 
important condition for the validity of the tests presented here. Of course, this 
evidence is in line with the lending channel hypothesis, while there may be other 
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possible explanations, including reverse causality. Panel B shows the summary 
statistics during periods of deposit contraction. Again, the evidence is supportive of 
the lending channel being stronger in developing countries. The contraction in loans is 
more severe for high-cost banks both in developed and in developing countries. 
Interestingly, high-cost banks operating in developing countries actually show a lower 
average contraction in deposits. Panel C displays the summary statistics during periods 
of deposit expansion. Here the difference in loan growth across high- and low-cost 
banks is not significant. 
Overall, the descriptive evidence is consistent with the existence of a lending 
channel. The next two exercises provide more formal tests. Consider first the effects of 
exchange rate movements on loan growth. The lending channel model has testable 
implications regarding the cross-sectional behavior of bank loans in response to 
exchange rate depreciation, which can be stated as follows. 
Hypothesis 1: Loan growth is more sensitive to exchange rate depreciation for smaller 
banks, for banks operating in developing countries, and for banks facing higher costs 
of non-insured debt financing. 
The hypothesis being tested states that depreciation has a more negative effect 
on loan growth for banks facing steeper marginal costs of non-insured debt financing. 
Under the presumption that these are the smaller banks, as well as the banks operating 
in developing countries, this implies that the interaction between depreciation and the 
developing country dummy should be negative, and that the interaction between 
depreciation, size and the ‘developing country’ dummy should be positive. Column 1 
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in Table 6 presents the results. As expected, loan growth is higher for banks having a 
more liquid asset structure at the beginning of the period, which may reflect a 
tendency to relocate the bank's portfolio in favor of less liquid assets. Also, in line 
with the hypothesis, loan growth is higher for bigger banks and decreases with 
currency depreciation. The effect of depreciation on loan growth is significantly 
stronger in developing countries. Note also that the interaction between depreciation 
and bank size implies that loan growth of bigger banks operating in developing 
countries is less affected by depreciation, which again is consistent with the 
hypothesis. 
A possible explanation of the above differences in the sensitivity of loan 
growth to depreciation across developed and developing countries is that they come 
from differences in the size of shocks. This would bias the results if the underlying 
relationship between depreciation and loan growth were non-linear. Throughout the 
period studied, depreciation rates are very different across both groups of countries. 
While the highest rate of depreciation for developed counties is 24 percent (Italy in 
1993), the sample includes several episodes of high inflation for Latin American 
countries (for example Peru: 425 percent in 1990, Brazil: 318 percent in 1990, 
Venezuela: 87 percent in 1989, and Mexico: 81 percent in 1987). Thus, the differences 
between developing and developed countries may be due to differences in the size of 
the exchange rate shocks. To control for this, the results reported in Column 2 exclude 
years with exchange rate depreciation higher than 25 percent. The results remain valid. 
As a third exercise, to explore the sensitivity of this result to the inclusion of United 
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States banks (whose corresponding depreciation rate is zero by definition), Column 3 
reports the same regression excluding all United States banks (as well as years with 
depreciation rates higher than 25 percent). The results also remain consistent with the 
stated hypothesis. 
One shortcoming of this test is that it relies on the assumption that smaller 
banks, as well as banks operating in developing countries, face steeper marginal costs 
of non-insured debt. A more direct approach can be obtained by using information on 
the actual costs on non-insured debt for each bank. The result 3 above suggests that a 
bank facing a steeper marginal cost of non-insured debt will also pay higher average 
interest rates in equilibrium. This provides a basis for including the DUMMY COST OF 
DEBT in the regressions. The results are presented in Table 6, Column 4. They reveal 
that loan growth decreases with exchange rate depreciation, and that bigger banks 
operating in developing countries experience a lower contraction in loan growth. 
Moreover, banks facing higher costs of non-insured debt financing have a higher 
sensitivity of loan growth to exchange rate depreciation, particularly in developing 
countries. This result is robust to the exclusion of periods with exchange rate 
depreciation higher that 25 percent per year (Column 5) as well as to the exclusion of 
the United States banks (Column 6). Therefore, the evidence shows that banks 
identified a priori as facing steeper marginal costs of non-deposit debt have a higher 
sensitivity of loan growth to depreciation. The next test considers the sensitivity of 
loan growth to changes in other indicators of monetary conditions. 
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Hypothesis 2: Loan growth is more sensitive to tight monetary conditions for smaller 
banks, for banks operating in developing countries, and for banks facing higher costs 
of non-insured debt financing. 
This hypothesis is tested with two sets of regressions. The first includes two 
measures of monetary conditions: money market rates, and an indicator of reserve 
requirements. Money market rates are included to provide a measure of the degree of 
liquidity in the financial system. In terms of the model above, they reflect foreign 
interest rates and exchange rate depreciation. Thus, one may expect that much of the 
information content in exchange rate depreciation is actually embedded in money 
market rates. The second set of regressions includes the three month treasury bill rate, 
exchange rate depreciation, and the indicator on reserve requirements. 
As before, these variables are interacted with bank characteristics to look for 
cross-sectional differences in the response of loan growth.  
The results of the first set of regressions are shown in Table 7. The first 
column presents the results of the regression based on the whole sample, and the 
second excludes United States banks. To simplify the presentation, the coefficients are 
grouped in two panels. Panel A reports those associated with reserve requirements, 
and Panel B reports those associated with money market rates. 
As in the previous exercise, the results show that banks with more liquid assets 
at the beginning of the fiscal year tend to have higher rates of loan growth. More 
interesting, this effect is stronger for banks operating in developing countries. Going 
now to Panel A, there is some evidence that loan growth is lower in periods of higher 
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than average reserve requirements, and that loan growth of bigger banks is less 
sensitive to changes in required reserves, with no significant differences between 
developed and developing countries. A possible explanation for the weak relationship 
between loan growth and reserve requirements within countries is the use of reserve 
requirements to counteract capital flows. In particular, if reserves are increased in 
periods of large capital inflows, as argued in Reinhart and Reinhart (1999), they may 
not be associated with a reduction of available funds to banks. 
Going now to Panel B, the evidence strongly supports the stated hypothesis. 
Loan growth is lower than average in periods of higher than average money market 
rates, and the sensitivity of loan growth to money market rates is stronger for banks 
operating in developing countries. In addition, loan growth of bigger banks is less 
sensitive to fluctuations in money market rates, and banks with high costs of non-
insured debt display a higher sensitivity of loans to money market rates. Also in line 
with hypothesis 2 is the fact that banks operating in developing countries show 
significantly higher coefficients (in absolute value). The second column shows that the 
results on money market rates for banks operating in developed countries are driven 
by the sub-sample of banks operating outside the United States. 
The results of the second set of regressions are shown in Table 8. The 
coefficients of the control variables are omitted for convenience. Panel A presents the 
results on reserve requirements. There is some evidence that loan growth goes down in 
periods of higher than average reserve requirements, with no significant difference 
across groups of countries. In addition, bigger banks are more able to isolate loan 
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growth from changes in reserves, while banks facing high costs of non-deposit debt 
display the opposite tendency, especially in developing countries. Panel B presents the 
results on Treasury Bill rates. The evidence shows that changes in international 
interest rates have no significant effect on loan growth. This result was also obtained 
by using LIBOR as an indicator of international rates. Panel C presents the results on 
depreciation, which are similar to those obtained before and do not require further 
comment. 
So far, the evidence is consistent with the idea that banks are unable to freely 
substitute deposit financing with other sources, and therefore play a role in the 
transmission of shocks to deposits to the market for bank loans. In fact, similar results 
have been found using data on United States banks and have frequently been 
interpreted as supporting the lending channel hypothesis. However, this interpretation 
has not been free of debate, since the finding is also consistent with the presence of 
systematic differences in the response of loan demand to interest rates across banks 
with different characteristics. In particular, it has been argued that the observed 
differences in loan growth across bank sizes may also arise if smaller banks lend a 
higher proportion of their portfolio to more procyclical small businesses. In the present 
exercise, the reported differences in bank loan behavior across developed and 
developing countries shed additional light into the picture. One may still argue that, in 
developing countries, periods of high interest rates may coincide with particularly 
unstable macroeconomic conditions, so that movements in loan demand may still be 
causing the observed cross-country differences, even after controlling for GDP 
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growth. Similarly, the fact that loan growth varies systematically across banks facing 
different costs of non-insured debt could also be attributable to systematic differences 
in loan demand. For example, banks facing higher cost of debt may have riskier 
borrowers or a loan portfolio more sensitive to shocks.  
An Alternative Specification 
The regressions presented in the previous section, while suggestive, may still be 
subject to some caveats. First, while the models were specified in growth rates to 
reduce the incidence of serial autocorrelation, this treatment restricts the 
autocorrelation coefficient to unity, while the use of growth rates could introduce 
mean reversion in the results. Second, the use of bank balance sheet variables to proxy 
for liquidity constraints, even if lagged, introduces the possibility of endogeneity bias. 
For example, bank assets and loans, or liquid assets and loans are probably jointly 
determined, and the use of lags may not be sufficient to control for this problem. A 
more appropriate treatment would be to model these variables as predetermined. 
Third, by directly testing of the sensitivity of loans to monetary conditions, the 
previous specification neglects the underlying hypothetical channel operating though 
deposits. 
This section, presents an alternative—and to some extent more basic—
specification. It regresses the log of loans (in levels) against their lagged values and 
the log of deposits, instrumented by monetary conditions (i.e. MONEY MARKET RATE, 
exchange DEPRECIATION, RESERVE REQUIREMENTS and the US TREASURY BILL RATE). 
The specification also includes GDP GROWTH to control for loan changes in demand 
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and adds interacting terms with the DEVELOPING dummy to explore for differences in 
the response of loans to deposits across developed and developing countries. Under 
this specification, a lending channel being more severe in developing countries would 
imply a higher coefficient for the interaction of deposits with the developing country 
dummy. 
An alternative specification including the lagged values of liquidity and 
capitalization, as well as their interactions with deposits and with the developing 
dummy was also computed. A priori, the sensitivity of loans to leposits would be 
expected to be lower for banks with higher capitalization and/or liquidity in the 
previous period. 
Due to the inclusion of the lagged values of the dependent variable, the 
regression was computed with GMM, using the Arellano-Bond (1991) estimator. The 
results of the one-step estimation with robust standard errors are presented in Table 9. 
The regressions in columns [1] to [3] employ the whole sample, excluding episodes of 
exchange rate depreciation above 25 percent per year, while the regressions presented 
in columns [4] to [6] also exclude United Stated banks. 
In general, the results confirm the high autocorrelation of loans (in most cases 
around 0.6), which provides a reassuring support for the specifications presented in the 
previous section. At the bottom of the table, the tests reject the null of no first-order 
autocorrelation in the differenced residuals, but is not possible to reject the null of no 
second-order autocorrelation in all cases. The presence of first-order autocorrelation, 
however, does not imply that the estimates are inconsistent. Going to the coefficients, 
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loans are shown to be more pro-cyclical and also more closely correlated with deposits 
in developing countries. In columns [2] and [5], there is some evidence that banks 
with higher capitalization tend to have a larger loan portfolio at the end of the 
following year. This relationship is somewhat weaker for banks operating in 
developing countries, but the difference is not statistically significant. Perhaps more 
importantly, the regressions in columns [3] and [6] add interacting terms between 
deposits and bank characteristics, as well as further interactions with the developing 
country dummy. The results strongly indicate that banks with higher capitalization 
and/or liquidity tend to have a larger loan portfolio at the end of the following year, 
with a significantly lower coefficient for developing countries. Also, the sensitivity of 
loans to deposits is lower for banks with higher (lagged) capitalization and/or 
liquidity, but less so for developing countries.  
Concluding Remarks 
This chapter looks at the international evidence on the lending channel. The results 
presented strongly support the hypothesis that banks play a role in the transmission of 
these disturbances into the economy, and that the transmission is stronger precisely 
where banks are more important as a source of firm financing, that is, in developing 
countries. The chapter makes two contributions to the existing literature. First, by 
looking at cross-country data, it uses a source of variation not exploited in previous 
work, namely, differences in the degree of capital market imperfection across 
countries. It is well known that the lending channel hinges on the existence of capital 
market imperfections. In particular, it requires frictions preventing banks from freely 
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substituting deposit financing with other sources, and it requires that (at least some) 
firms be dependent on bank loans to execute their investment decisions or to operate 
normally. While the measurement of capital market imperfections is elusive, it may be 
argued that they tend to be more intense in developing countries. In fact, existing 
evidence shows that firms operating in developing countries are more dependent on 
bank loans. This provides the basis for the cross-sectional variation exploited in this 
chapter. 
The second contribution is that the paper stresses the importance of the foreign 
exchange market as a potential source of shocks to bank deposits. By focusing on 
United States data, the existing literature on the lending channel restricts the attention 
to the role of banks in the transmission of monetary policy. Overlooking of the 
relationship between the foreign exchange market and the bank deposit market is 
natural since the United States is a relatively closed economy. Nevertheless, in the 
open economy case, the importance of the foreign exchange market comes to the front. 
Accordingly, this chapter argues that banks may also play an active role in the 
transmission of shocks to the foreign exchange market into the economy. 
The results strongly support the hypothesis that banks play an active role in the 
transmission of monetary and exchange rate shocks, especially in developing 
countries. At the macro-level, the co-movement of interest spreads and exchange rate 
depreciation systematically differs across developed and developing countries. In 
particular, lending-minus-deposit spreads increase with exchange rate depreciation in 
developing countries, while showing no apparent change in developed countries. This 
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holds true for similar rates of currency depreciation in both groups of countries. A 
similar result is obtained with lending-minus-LIBOR spreads. While these results may 
be consistent with several alternative explanations, it is also implied by the predictions 
of a lending channel model. This empirical regularity across groups of countries seems 
to be robust and opens the door for further research. 
At the bank level, this chapter compares the response of bank loan growth to 
monetary conditions across banks of different characteristics. Specifically, four 
variables are considered: exchange rate depreciation, money market rates, Treasury 
Bill rates, and changes in reserve requirements. Among these four indicators, 
exchange rate depreciation and money market rates appear to have the stronger effects 
on loan growth. On the other hand, international interest rates, frequently blamed as a 
shock to developing countries financial systems, do not have any significant effect on 
loan growth.  
From the policy perspective, the results presented in this chapter show the 
importance of the foreign exchange market as a source of credit fluctuations and 
support the idea of contractionary devaluations, particularly in developing countries. 
On the other hand, the results also call for policies aimed at developing local capital 
markets, or to ease the access of domestic banks to international markets. In this sense, 
opening the local stock markets to foreign investors, a policy implemented in most 
developing countries since the 80's, seems to be a movement in the right direction. 
Complementary policies to improve the institutional structure of local capital markets 
and to increase transparency (i.e., bankruptcy laws, shareholders' protection, 
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accounting standards) may also contribute to the development of domestic capital 
markets. 
Regarding bank regulation, the results suggest that allowing deposits in foreign 
currency could contribute to stabilize the local deposit base, by shielding their value 
against currency fluctuations. An alternative would be to allow foreign banking entry. 
If foreign banks are able to use internal funds from their parent companies in response 
to a liquidity squeeze, they may help isolate the credit market from shocks to deposits. 
Moreover, foreign banks may also have an effect on the stability of deposits 
themselves if they are perceived as being stronger than local banks. Evaluating 
whether foreign bank participation helps to isolate the credit market from monetary 
disturbances is a natural extension of the exercise presented here and is the main focus 
of the next chapter. 
The results presented here are a first pass, and additional empirical research is 
called for. On the one hand, the sample used here is skewed towards large, public 
banks, which are less likely to be liquidity constrained. In that sense, it is remarkable 
that the results obtained still support the existence of a bank lending channel. 
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Chapter 4: Are Foreign Banks Different?∗ 
Are foreign banks less responsive to monetary conditions in emerging economies? 
This chapter uses a panel dataset of 1565 banks in 20 Asian and Latin American 
countries during 1989-2001, to test for systematic differences in the sensitivity of loan 
and deposit growth to various measures of monetary conditions, across domestic and 
foreign banks. It also looks for systematic differences in the response of bank-specific 
lending and deposit rates to monetary conditions across domestic and foreign banks. 
As a robustness check, the chapter further explores differences in the behavior of 
domestic and foreign banks during normal times and periods of financial distress, 
exploiting various definitions of banking and currency crises available in the literature. 
The results indicate that the response of loans and deposits to monetary 
conditions is similar across domestic and foreign banks. In particular, periods of 
tighter monetary conditions are associated with lower loan and deposit growth, but 
differences across domestic and foreign banks appear to be weak. In contrast, the 
sensitivity of loan growth to monetary conditions tends to be correlated with 
observable bank characteristics such as capitalization and asset liquidity. However, 
differences across domestic and foreign banks do emerge in the behavior of interest 
rates. Lending and deposit rates of foreign banks display a lower sensitivity to 
monetary conditions, and they also react smoothly during periods of financial distress, 
suggesting that foreign banks are in a better position to attract deposits. 
                                                 
∗ This chapter is based on join work with Carmen Reinhart and Marco Arena. 
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A possible interpretation of these results is that foreign banks are not less 
financially constrained than domestic, due perhaps to organizational arrangements that 
prevent them from receiving funding from their mother institutions. Otherwise, if 
foreign banks are in fact less financially constrained, the results presented here only 
provide weak evidence in support of the bank-lending hypothesis of monetary 
transmission. At a more general level, the evidence indicates that foreign bank 
participation in emerging economies has not led to increased instability in credit 
markets. 
Foreign bank participation in emerging economies is a relatively recent 
phenomenon that in most cases goes back to the mid-1990s, reflecting global trends of 
consolidation and integration in the banking industry, as well as privatization and 
financial liberalization in emerging economies. In major Latin American countries, the 
percent of total bank assets controlled by foreign institutions reached 25 percent in 
1999 (45 percent excluding Brazil and Mexico) from 7.5 percent in 1994 
(International Monetary Fund (2000)). In Asian countries, foreign bank participation 
has been relatively less important, increasing after the removal of entry restrictions in 
the aftermath of the 1998 financial crisis. 
The increased foreign bank presence in emerging economies has triggered 
interest in assessing its potential effects on efficiency in the banking industry, as well 
as on financial stability. So far, studies comparing the behavior of domestic and 
foreign banks in emerging economies are still incipient, and most of them focus on the 
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efficiency effects of foreign bank entry.13 This chapter belongs to the strand that 
focuses on the effects of foreign bank entry on financial stability. The main interest is 
to assess whether foreign bank entry has altered the response of the banking system to 
domestic and external shocks. 
A priori, arguments on the potential effects of foreign banks on the stability of 
the banking sector are mixed. On the positive side, it has been argued that foreign 
banks may help stabilize the supply of credit if they are able to resort to upstream 
financing from their mother companies, especially during bad times. Moreover, 
foreign banks themselves may have a more stable deposit base if they are perceived as 
more robust than their domestic counterparts. On the negative side, it has been argued 
that foreign banks may easily pull out from emerging countries, and that they could in 
fact transmit external shocks into host countries. 
This chapter is closely related to Dages et al. (2000), which compares the 
lending behavior of domestic and foreign banks in Mexico and Argentina during the 
nineties, and finds no significant differences. Nevertheless, their coverage is much 
smaller and their approach studies the behavior of lending before- and after-crisis 
periods, as well as the sensitivity of lending to economic activity and real interest 
rates. Instead, this chapter studies the sensitivity of bank lending to various measures 
of monetary conditions. 
                                                 
13 The working hypothesis is that foreign bank entry leads to increased competition 
and efficiency in the banking industry, since foreign banks tend to use more modern 
management and risk-taking practices. To date, the empirical evidence indicates that 
competitive pressures caused by foreign entry have led to improvements in banking 
system efficiency (see for example, Barajas et al. (2000); Claessens and Glaessner 
(1999); Claessens et al. (2001); Crystal et al. (2001)). 
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This chapter is also related to the literature on the lending channel of monetary 
transmission, which focuses on the role of banks in the transmission of monetary 
shocks into credit markets, via loan-supply effects.14 The basic hypothesis is that 
capital market imperfections may prevent (at least some) banks from freely 
substituting away a negative shock to deposits with other sources of funding. In 
consequence, financially constrained banks may optimally choose to cut lending in 
response to a shock to deposits, affecting the availability of funds to bank-dependent 
firms. A longstanding issue in the lending channel literature is how to disentangle 
whether the responses of credit to monetary shocks come from loan demand—as 
implied by interest rate channels—or if loan supply effects are also present. 
In order to get around this identification problem, empirical studies have 
increasingly resorted to the use of bank-level data, testing for cross-sectional 
differences in the response of bank lending to monetary shocks across banks with 
different degrees of financial constraints. Since financial constraints are not directly 
observable, they have been usually proxied by bank characteristics such as liquidity, 
size, and capitalization (for example, Jayaratne and Morgan (2000), Kishan and Opiela 
(2000), Kashyap and Stein (2000)). Financial constraints have also been proxied by 
bank ownership. Houston et al. (1997) explored the role of internal markets in 
banking, and found that the loan growth of bank subsidiaries is sensitive to the 
financial position of their holding companies. A similar approach was applied by 
Ashcraft (2000), who exploited a panel database of U.S. banks, using bank affiliation 
                                                 
14 Among others, earlier contributions include Bernanke and Blinder (1988), Kahyap, 
et al. (1993), Bernanke and Gertler (1995), Kashyap and Stein (1995). 
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with multi-bank holding companies to proxy for financial constraints. In the 
international context, a similar approach was implemented by Peek and Rosengren 
(1997), who looked at data on Japanese banks operating in the U.S., and found that 
binding risk-based capital requirements associated with the Japanese stock market 
decline of end-1980s translated into a decline in lending by their U.S. branches. 
This chapter follows a parallel approach and exploits the presence of internal 
financial markets as a source of cross-sectional variation between domestic and 
foreign banks. However, the emphasis here is completely different, since the main 
purpose is to study the response of bank lending to monetary conditions in the host 
country, instead of dealing with the role of foreign banks in the transmission of shocks 
across countries. 
To the extent that foreign banks are less financially constrained than 
domestic—especially during periods of tight monetary conditions—comparing the 
relative responses of loan growth to monetary conditions across domestic and foreign 
banks provides an alternative way to tackle the identification problem. This test hinges 
on the validity of two assumptions. First, all else equal (i.e. capitalization levels, asset 
liquidity, and other observable bank characteristics), foreign banks have to be less 
financially constrained than domestic, either because they can resort to internal funds, 
or because they face a more stable deposit base. Second, loan demand facing domestic 
banks cannot be systematically different from the loan demand of foreign banks. 
This identification strategy is implemented with the use of bank-level fixed 
effects regressions, splitting the sample of banks between domestic and foreign with 
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the use of a dummy variable. A baseline exercise compares the response of selected 
balance sheet components to monetary conditions across domestic and foreign banks, 
after controlling for changes in loan demand, proxied by GDP growth, and observable 
bank characteristics such as size, liquidity and capitalization. A second, more 
restrictive set of tests further splits the sample of banks by their liquidity and 
capitalization levels, and explores for systematic differences in the response of loan 
growth across domestic and foreign banks, in the subsets of banks with lower liquidity 
and capitalization relative to other banks operating in the same country. Finally, a third 
test uses various definitions of currency, banking and debt crises and compares the 
behavior of domestic and foreign banks throughout crises and tranquil periods. 
The main contributions of the chapter are as follows. First, it adds to the scarce 
literature on the lending channel outside the United States, particularly in emerging 
markets. Second, it exploits a novel approach to identify supply-side effects in the 
credit market, which is one of the main challenges of the lending channel literature. 
Specifically, it uses differences in bank ownership (i.e. domestic versus foreign) to 
capture variations in liquidity constraints across banks. Third, it uses a comprehensive 
bank-level panel dataset, covering most Latin American and emerging Asian countries 
during the nineties, and reconstructs the evolution of bank ownership by intersecting 
the sample of banks with a complete list of mergers and acquisitions during the period. 
Fourth, the chapter assembles a dataset of reserve requirements for a sample of 20 
emerging market countries, using information from central bank reports. Finally, this 
chapter also explores the response of bank-specific deposit and lending rates to 
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changes in monetary conditions. Previous work has mainly concentrated on the 
behavior of bank loans, neglecting the additional information provided by the behavior 
of bank spreads. 
The rest of the chapter is divided as follows. The next section discusses the 
methodology and the hypotheses tested, as well as potential sources of bias and 
endogeneity problems. The third section describes the data. The fifth section presents 
the results of the regressions of selected balance sheet components on monetary 
conditions, splitting the sample between domestic and foreign banks. The sixth section 
focuses more closely on the response of loan growth to monetary conditions, further 
splitting the sample of banks by capitalization and liquidity levels.  Section seven 
explores for systematic differences in the behavior of domestic and foreign banks 
during tranquil and crises periods, and section eight summarizes the main conclusions 
and presents a brief discussion of possible extensions. 
Methodology 
As mentioned above, in recent years the empirical literature on the lending channel 
has increasingly focused on bank-level data to identify changes in the supply of bank 
credit. The strategy usually consists in testing for systematic differences in the 
response of loan growth to monetary conditions, across banks facing different degrees 
of financial constraints. Since financial constraints cannot be directly measured, they 
are usually proxied by observable bank characteristics such as size, liquidity, and 
capitalization. This chapter uses a parallel approach, and goes a step further, since it 
also uses an alternative measure of cross-sectional variation in the degree of financial 
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constraints, namely, bank ownership. The underlying hypothesis is that, all else equal, 
foreign banks may be less financially constrained than domestic if they are able to 
resort to upstream funds from their mother companies, especially during periods of 
financial distress. 
To implement this idea, the chapter implements a series of tests to explore the 
response of selected balance sheet and income statement components to changes in 
monetary conditions, across domestic and foreign banks, after controlling for other 
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In this equation, i=1,...,N refers to individual banks (panels), c=1,...,C to countries, and 
t=1,...,Ti to time. The sample is unbalanced, so Ti varies across banks. The constants 
αi, are the bank-level fixed effects. Each one of the six groups of regressions uses a 
different (bank-level) dependent variable, yict, including: LOAN GROWTH, DEPOSIT 
GROWTH, the ratio of net LOANS TO DEPOSITS, LENDING RATES, DEPOSIT RATES, and 
LENDING MINUS DEPOSIT SPREADS. Loan and deposit growth were computed by taking 
the first difference of the (log) of the corresponding series, measured in constant 
(1995) local currency units. Bank-specific lending and deposit rates were estimated by 
combining information from income statements and balance sheets. Specifically, 
lending rates were computed by dividing interest revenues by average loans, and 
deposit rates were computed by dividing interest expenses on deposits over average 
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deposits. The spreads between lending and deposit rates were computed as the 
difference between these two. 
The vector x contains country-level variables intended to control for changes in 
loan demand. Here the specification includes the natural logarithm of GDP, also 
measured in 1995 local currency. The vector z contains bank-level characteristics 
intended to proxy for financial constraints. Following the standard practice, three 
indicators were used: a measure of bank size, an indicator of asset liquidity, and an 
indicator of bank capitalization. Regarding bank size, the presumption is that bigger 
banks face lower external finance premia and are thus better prepared to substitute 
away a shock to deposits with other forms of financing. The chapter uses a relative 
measure of SIZE, computed as the difference between the log of assets of a bank in a 
given year (in 1995 local currency), and the average computed over all banks in the 
same country and year. This treatment removes trends in bank and has been 
implemented in previous studies (for example, Hernando and Martínez-Pagés (2001); 










)ln( ∑∈−=  , for c=1,...,C   
Where Nct stands for the number of banks in country c in year t. Therefore, the 
resulting measure is a normalized variable with zero mean for each country and year. 
The second variable, asset LIQUIDITY, was computed as the proportion of liquid assets 
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in total assets.15 The argument is that banks with more liquid assets are in better 
position to isolate loans from unexpected shocks to deposits. The third variable, 
CAPITALIZATION, was defined as equity capital over total assets. The presumption is 
that better-capitalized banks tend to pay lower risk premia on non-insured debt 
financing, and therefore face lower liquidity restrictions. These two variables were 
normalized with respect to the sample averages of each country. For example, the 
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Where Nc is the number of observations in country c over the whole period. A similar 
treatment was applied to capitalization. Potential endogeneity problems and sources of 
bias associated with these variables are discussed below. 
Going back to the specification, the vector m contains several measures of 
monetary conditions. First, the evolution of liquidity in the banking system was 
captured with the rates on short term lending between financial institutions, MONEY 
MARKET RATES, (series 60b of the IFS).16 Second, the evolution of required reserves 
was tracked with RESERVE REQUIREMENTS, an indicator variable constructed on the 
basis of central bank reports (see Appendix 1 to 3 for details). This indicator was 
                                                 
15 Liquid assets include cash and reserves, government bonds, and other marketable 
securities. 
16 For countries with incomplete or not available information on money market rates, 
an alternative indicator was used. Deposit rates (series 60L) were used for Bolivia, 
Chile, Colombia, Panamá, Paraguay, and Venezuela; the call money rate (series 60) 
was used for India; the 1-month average interbank offer rate for Hong Kong; and the 
interbank rate for Taiwan. 
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allowed to vary on a scale from 1 to 5, with a larger number indicating higher reserve 
requirements.17 Third, monetary conditions include the yearly percent change of the 
average market exchange rate, DEPRECIATION, (series rf of the IFS), and the three-
month US Treasury bill rate, T-BILL (series 11160c of the IFS). The inclusion of these 
two variables follows from the fact that all countries included in the sample are small 
open economies. Thus, developments in the foreign exchange market tend to affect the 
stability of banks' deposits. Potential multicollinearity problems among these 
monetary indicators were avoided by running two specifications. The first includes 
domestic interest rates and reserve requirements. The second exploits the uncovered 
interest parity condition replacing domestic interest rates with both international 
interest rates and the change in the nominal exchange rate. 
Separate regressions were estimated for Asia and Latin America, under the 
presumption that differences in macroeconomic performance as well as in banking 
regulations and practices between these two regions render the population parameters 
different. It is well known, for example, that foreign bank entry in emerging markets 
has led to the emergence of "regional evolvers", that is, banks that use their relative 
advantages (for example: historic and cultural links with host countries) to focus their 
international expansion into a particular region. This is the case for Spanish banks in 
Latin America, and Japanese banks in East Asia. 
                                                 
17 Actual reserve requirements (in percent) are not used because in some cases these 
are defined on marginal deposits, while in other cases they are based on average 




Turning now to a brief discussion of the tests performed, the lending channel 
hypothesis has clear implications for cross-sectional differences in the response of the 
selected endogenous variables to changes in monetary conditions, across banks with 
different levels of financial constraints. Under the null that foreign banks are less 
financially constrained than domestic, a basic test could be conducted by comparing 
the coefficients associated with the monetary conditions (the δ’s) between domestic 
and foreign banks. Following this, a test of coefficient equality between these two 
groups was implemented with the help of dummy variables interacted with each right-
hand side variable. An additional, more restrictive test was also implemented by 
further splitting the sample by bank characteristics. In particular, dummy variables 
were created to separate banks with lagged capitalization above the 75th percentile 
with respect to the sample of banks operating in the same country. Similarly, another 
set of dummy variables was created to separate banks with lagged liquidity above the 
75th percentile with respect to the rest of banks in the same country. 
We now turn to a brief discussion of the models that use quantity-related 
endogenous variables (i.e. loans and deposits). The first model provides a test for the 
sensitivity of loan growth to changes in monetary conditions which, under the lending 
channel hypothesis, is expected to be stronger for more financially constrained banks. 
Thus, under the null, the coefficients associated with domestic banks are expected to 
be higher in absolute value (i.e. more negative) than those for foreign banks. The 
second model further explores for differences in the sensitivity of the deposit base to 
monetary conditions across domestic and foreign banks. Here the main interest is 
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exploratory. In principle, if banks have the capacity to adjust their deposit rates to 
partially offset a negative shock to deposits, the lending channel hypothesis should 
imply a lower sensitivity of deposits to monetary conditions for more financially 
constrained banks—since they are less capable of replacing them with other sources of 
funds and are thus more likely to raise deposit rates in order to maintain their deposit 
base. The third model is closely related to the previous two. It checks for changes in 
the relative importance of deposits in the financing of loan portfolios, in response to 
changes in monetary conditions. The lending channel hypothesis implies that the 
associated coefficient should be insignificant for more financially constrained banks, 
and positive for less financially constrained banks, since a lower proportion of loans 
will be financed with customer deposits in periods of tighter monetary conditions. 
Consider now the models with price-related endogenous variables (i.e. interest 
rates). The lending channel hypothesis implies a higher response of lending and 
deposit rates to tighter monetary conditions for financially constrained banks. 
Moreover, the lending minus deposit spread is expected to increase under tighter 
monetary conditions for financially constrained banks. This is because, in response to 
a negative shock to deposits, banks try to resort to alternative forms of financing, 
increasing the premium they pay on non-insured debt. By cost minimization, this 
implies that equilibrium deposit rates also increase (especially for financially 
constrained banks). Finally, because of the tax-like effect of reserve requirements on 
insured deposits, this increase is translated by more than one-to-one into the credit 
market, increasing the lending minus deposit spread. 
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As a by-product, the coefficients associated with GDP growth (the β’s) also 
allow us to explore for systematic differences in the cyclical behavior of the selected 
endogenous variables across domestic and foreign banks, and test if loand demand 
shocks affect the two types of banks differently. A similar exercise is provided in 
Goldberg et al. (2000) using data for Mexico and Argentina. 
There are potential endogeneity problems and bias associated with the use of 
bank characteristics (i.e. size, liquidity, and capitalization). Regarding size, a bank 
may actually become larger precisely because of large deposit (and loan) growth. 
Regarding capitalization, a bank may choose to be better capitalized because it faces a 
higher external finance premium in the first place. Therefore, it is unclear whether 
better-capitalized banks are in fact less financially constrained in equilibrium. 
Actually, balance sheet data show that capitalization decreases systematically with 
bank size, suggesting that it may be a poor indicator of the degree of liquidity 
constraints. A similar problem arises with the use of liquidity ratios. A bank may 
optimally choose to have a more liquid asset structure to compensate for higher 
financing restrictions. Again, it is unclear whether a less liquid asset structure is a 
clear-cut indicator of higher liquidity restrictions. To reduce these endogeneity 
problems, the regressions use lagged values of bank-level characteristics.  
A related problem, spurious correlation, may arise from the use of liquidity 
ratios as defined. To see why, suppose that bank assets are composed only of liquid 
instruments and loans. In this simplified balance sheet, a bank with higher-than-
average liquid assets in period t-1 will mechanically have a higher-than-average loan 
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growth in year t. Thus interacting monetary conditions with a liquidity indicator will 
tend to produce results biased in favor of the lending channel hypothesis (i.e. banks 
with more liquid balance sheets having less sensitivity of loan growth to monetary 
disturbances). The problem of spurious correlation can be avoided by choosing a 
different scaling variable. For example, liquid assets could be scaled by total deposits, 
which in fact seems to be the relevant measure if deposits are the main source of 
shocks to bank's liabilities. For comparative purposes, this chapter computes liquidity 
in the usual way (scaling liquid assets by total assets), but an additional exercise was 
implemented using deposits as the scaling variable with similar qualitative results. 
Data 
Bank-level data (i.e. financial statements) come from the Bankscope database. Series 
are yearly, covering a sample of 1,565 banks in 20 countries during 1989-2001. The 
sample of countries includes major Latin American and Southeast Asian economies.18 
Comparing the behavior of domestic and foreign banks in this sample of countries 
during the nineties offers a rich experiment, since it covers pre- and post-entry years, 
as well as several banking and balance of payment crises. In total, the sample has 
8,574 observations, distributed across time and countries as shown in Table 9. The 
decrease in the number of banks in Asia after 1997 reflects the consolidation process 
following the Asian crisis. 
                                                 
18 For Latin America, the list of countries includes: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. For East Asia: 
Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand, and Taiwan.  
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Using the Bankscope database has two major advantages. First, the coverage is 
fairly comprehensive, with sampled banks accounting for about 90 percent of total 
assets in each country. Second, the accounting information at the bank level is 
presented in standardized formats, after making adjustments for differences in 
accounting and reporting standards. The accounting information is presented at two 
consolidation levels. In most cases, the reported figures are unconsolidated. Yet, for 
some mother banks, Bankscope integrates information from subsidiaries and reports 
both unconsolidated and consolidated statements.19 To minimize changes in balance 
sheets arising from changes in ownership of subsidiaries, and to work with comparable 
accounting data, this chapter uses unconsolidated financial statements whenever 
possible. From the original source, unconsolidated figures were available in all but 73 
cases. For the purposes of the exercises below, balance sheet figures were converted 
into constant 1995 local currency using consumer price indexes (series 64 of the IFS). 
Series in constant 1995 US$ were also computed using the average market exchange 
rate for each country (series rf of the IFS). 
Outliers were identified through the application of several filters, including 
limits on the yearly change in total assets, on the yearly growth rate of loans and 
                                                 
19 Yet a third consolidation level adds up accounting information of a group of 
affiliated banks with no financial links between them. These aggregates statements 
were removed from the sample (four cases in total) since they have no legal entity 
associated (only its components are legal entities). 
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deposits, and on the ratio of net loans to deposits. A few cases with data deficiencies 
probably due to measurement errors and with negative equity were also removed.20 
The identification of foreign banks in each country was achieved in several 
complementary steps aimed to minimize misclassifications. A bank was classified as 
“foreign” in a given year, if it was a branch of a bank incorporated in a foreign 
country, or if had at least 51 percent of its capital in the hands of foreign shareholders. 
The ownership structure at the end of 2001, for each bank in the sample, was obtained 
from BankScope and from central banks. To obtain chronological information on the 
evolution of ownership throughout the period, the list of banks was crossed with a 
comprehensive list of mergers and acquisitions targeting financial institutions in the 
sampled countries (a detailed description is presented in Appendix 4). 
Descriptive evidence on the structure of balance sheets across regions and bank 
sizes is presented in Table 10. The regularities that emerge here have been pointed out 
in previous studies of the United States (Kayshap (1994)). Larger banks tend to have a 
higher proportion of loans to assets, and they rely more on non-deposit financing, and 
less on equity. These patterns are robust across regions. For the United States, similar 
patterns have been interpreted as consistent with the presence of imperfect substitution 
between deposits and other sources of financing, especially for smaller banks. In 
                                                 
20 Specifically, the following filters were used. First, 31 observations where yearly 
asset growth in constant US$ exceeded 200 percent in absolute terms were removed. 
Second, 57 cases where the yearly loan growth exceeded 300 percent in absolute 
terms, and 77 cases where the yearly deposit growth exceeded 300 percent in absolute 
terms, were also removed. Third, 27 cases where loans represented more than 100 
times the value of deposits were removed. Finally, 66 cases with negative deposits, 
and 94 cases with negative equity capital were also removed. In total, 316 
observations were removed. 
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particular, if small banks cannot completely offset shocks to deposits with other 
sources of financing, they will optimally hold a buffer stock of liquid assets to reduce 
the costs of early loan liquidation. In equilibrium, they will also tend to rely less on 
non-deposit financing and more on internal capital. 
This presumption can be further checked by splitting the sample across 
domestic and foreign banks. Foreign banks could be more aggressive in lending if they 
have access to internal financial resources from their mother institutions. Also, they 
could have systematic differences in the liability structure of their balance sheets 
compared to domestic banks. Table 11 presents summary statistics on loan growth, 
deposit growth, and several indicators of the structure of balance sheets for domestic 
and foreign banks, and by regions. In general, there are not strong differences in the 
structure of balance sheets structure across domestic and foreign banks, so the data 
does not fit into the hypothesized pattern. Net loans are in the range of 50 and 60 
percent of total assets, and other earning assets21 account for an additional 30 to 40 
percent. More variation across domestic and foreign banks is observed on loan growth 
and deposit growth. On average, foreign banks in Latin America have higher rates of 
deposit and loan growth than their domestic counterparts. In Asia, the opposite holds 
true. 
                                                 
21 Other earning assets include: government securities, equity investments, bonds, 




The results of the baseline regressions for the Asian and Latin American sub-samples 
are presented in Tables 12 and 13. For each sub-sample, six regressions are computed. 
All regressions are identical, except for their dependent variables. The first three use 
measures of quantities (loan growth, deposit growth, and loan to deposit ratios), and 
the rest use measures of prices (lending rates, deposit rates, and lending minus deposit 
spreads). The explanatory variables are divided in two panels. The upper panel 
includes GDP growth, and the bank-level controls, while the lower panel groups the 
monetary conditions. 
Going to the first two columns, the results show that loan and deposit growth 
tend to be procyclical (especially the former), with no statistically significant 
differences across domestic and foreign banks except for deposits in Asia. A similar 
result for loan growth was obtained in Goldberg et al. (2000) using data for Mexico 
and Argentina. In addition, banks with more liquid assets at the end of the previous 
accounting year tend to display larger loan growth and lower deposit growth, while 
banks with better capitalization also display higher loan and deposit growth. On the 
lower panel, the results indicate that loan growth decelerates with increases in money 
market rates and in reserve requirements, with no significant differences across 
domestic and foreign banks in the Latin American sub-sample. On the other hand, 
there is some evidence that loan growth of foreign banks tends to be more isolated 
from changes in money market rates but more sensitive to changes in reserve 
requirements in the Asian sub-sample. The results in the third column indicate that 
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loans and deposits tend to move one to one, independently of the economic cycle—at 
least at the one year frequency. 
Going to the last three columns, the upper panel shows that deposit rates tend 
to be countercyclical, with some evidence suggesting that this is less intense in the 
case of foreign banks. Bank spreads show a procyclical behavior, driven by 
movements in deposit rates. At the same time, larger and banks with higher liquidity 
tend to have generally lower lending and deposit rates and also lower interest spreads, 
but again, the results show no evidence of systematic differences between domestic 
and foreign banks. As expected, periods of tight monetary conditions are associated 
with higher lending and deposit rates, with inconclusive results in terms of spreads 
(for example, spreads go up for the Latin American sub-sample, and decrease for the 
Asian sub-sample). In general, foreign banks tend to display a lower sensitivity of 
lending and deposit rates to changes in monetary conditions. A possible explanation is 
that they are perceived as more reliable than domestic banks and are therefore able to 
attract deposits with relative small changes in interest rates. If this is in fact the case, it 
strengthens the power of the test of the lending channel used in this chapter. 
Summing up, there is no strong evidence of systematic differences in the 
response of loan and deposit growth to changes in monetary conditions across 
domestic and foreign banks, but the response of bank-specific lending and deposit 
rates to changes in monetary conditions systematically differs across domestic and 
foreign banks. All these results were qualitatively robust to the removal of 58 banks 
changing ownership during the period. 
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The model discussed so far assumes that the errors of the fixed-effect 
regressions are white noise. Nevertheless, given the nature of the data, which includes 
a time-series dimension, the error term could be autocorrelated within panels, probably 
following panel-specific processes. Also, although the dependent variables are 
expressed in growth rates, the error term could be heteroscedastic across panels. To 
take these into account, the equations were estimated again with Generalized Least 
Squares (GLS), allowing for panel-specific AR(1) processes. As the number of panels 
is much larger than the time series dimension, cross-sectional correlations between 
panels were not considered. The results obtained under this estimation (Tables 14 and 
15) tend to provide better support to the lending channel hypothesis. In particular, loan 
growth of foreign banks is less sensitive to monetary conditions in both Asia and Latin 
America, and some evidence suggests that deposits of foreign banks are also less 
sensitive to monetary conditions, especially in Latin America. At the same time, the 
evidence on prices is now weaker and the results on reserve requirements in Asia still 
go in the wrong direction. 
A Closer Look at Loan Growth 
The exercise presented in this section focuses on the response of loan growth to 
monetary conditions. Compared with the previous exercise, it goes a step further by 
adding interaction terms between bank ownership (i.e. domestic and foreign) and bank 
characteristics. In particular, besides partitioning the sample across domestic and 
foreign banks, two additional partitions were performed, the first separating banks 
with capitalization above and below the 75th percentile with respect other banks 
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operating in the same country, and the second separating banks above and below the 
75th liquidity percentile with respect to other banks operating in the same country. 
Arguably, banks with larger capitalization and more liquid assets will be less 
financially constrained, and therefore better equipped to isolate loan growth from 
changes in monetary conditions. Therefore, any differences between domestic and 
foreign banks are expected to be stronger in the sub-samples of banks with lower 
liquidity and/or capitalization. 
The results are presented in Tables 16 to 19. All tables share the same format, 
with three sets of regressions each. The leftmost regressions cover the whole sample, 
while the other two are computed on sub-samples partitioned by bank characteristics 
(i.e. liquidity and capitalization). To facilitate the reading, each regression presents the 
coefficients of domestic banks alongside the matching coefficients for foreign banks, 
and the p-values for the null(s) of coefficient equality between square brackets. 
Going to the results, the coefficients associated with the money market rate are 
statistically significant and have the expected (negative) sign for domestic banks, but 
are non significant in the case of foreign banks, which provides support to the lending 
channel hypothesis. The differences between domestic and foreign banks are 
noticeably stronger for the sub samples of less liquid and/or less capitalized banks than 
for the full sample. The coefficients associated to the reserve requirement ratio are 
also statistically significant and have the expected (negative) sign for both regions, but 
no statistically significant differences arise between domestic and foreign banks in 
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Latin America, while foreign banks display a higher sensitivity to reserve 
requirements in the Asian sub sample. 
As a complementary exercise, the same regressions were computed with 
alternative measures of monetary conditions. The new measures include reserve 
requirements as before, but exploit the uncovered interest parity condition replacing 
money market rates with the nominal exchange rate depreciation and international 
interests proxied by the federal funds rate. To get a sense of the relationship between 
these indicators of monetary conditions, Table 20 presents the pair-wise correlations, 
by regions, together with the p-values for the nulls of zero correlation. In the case of 
Latin America, there is a positive and significant correlation between money market 
rates, depreciation, reserve requirements, and the federal funds rate. For the case of 
Asia, the money market rate is also highly correlated with the nominal exchange 
depreciation rate, but not with the federal funds rate of with reserve requirements, 
which explains the results previously reported.22 
The results of the regressions using the alternative indicators of monetary 
conditions, presented in Tables 21 to 24, are comparable to those reported above. They 
provide weak evidence in support of the lending channel in the case of Latin America, 
and a less conclusive mix for the Asian sub-sample. For Latin America, loan growth 
decelerates with exchange rate depreciation, with foreign banks displaying a lower 
sensitivity. Moreover, the differences appear to be driven by less liquid and/or less 
                                                 
22 Similar results were obtained using other indicators of foreign interest rates, 
including the U.S. treasury bill rate, and the Japanese and Australian money market 
rates for the case of Asia. 
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capitalized banks. For the Asian sub-sample, the results are mixed, but also seem to 
indicate that loan growth of domestic banks decreases with exchange rate depreciation 
(especially for banks with lower liquidity and capitalization). On the other hand, loan 
growth of foreign banks increases with exchange depreciation.  
Going now to the coefficients associated with reserve requirements, the results 
for the Latin American sub-sample have the expected (negative) sign, and are mainly 
driven by less liquid and/or less capitalized banks, with no significant differences 
across domestic and foreign banks. For the Asian sub-sample, while the coefficients 
also have the expected (negative) sign, foreign banks display a larger sensitivity than 
domestic, which runs contrary to the lending channel hypothesis.  
The coefficients associated with the Federal Funds rate have the expected 
(negative) sign for the Latin American sub-sample but the standard errors are too high 
to be conclusive, and there are not significant differences across domestic or foreign 
banks. For the Asian sub-sample, the coefficients of the Federal Funds rate are either 
not significant or have the wrong sign. Similar results were obtained using other 
indicators of international interest rates, which may reflect the lack of reliance on 
capital inflows by Asian countries. 
Summing up, the regressions show that loan growth is procyclical and tends to 
slow down with tighter monetary conditions. The results also indicate that loan growth 
of well capitalized, or more liquid banks, is less sensitive to changes in monetary 
conditions, but no major differences arise between domestic and foreign banks. The 
few exceptions provide some support to the lending channel hypothesis. The 
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simultaneous finding of systematic differences in the sensitivity of loan growth to 
monetary conditions across banks with different degrees of liquidity and 
capitalization, but no differences between domestic and foreign banks, suggest that 
bank ownership may be a poor proxy for financial constraints, probably because 
institutional arrangements prevent subsidiaries from resorting to automatic financing 
from their mother companies. 
The results obtained so far implicitly assume that the behavior of domestic and 
foreign banks is similar during tranquil times and during periods of financial distress. 
However, there is no reason to reject a priori the possibility of non linear patterns. For 
example, differences in the behavior of domestic and foreign banks (and their 
depositors) may be magnified during periods of financial distress. The next section 
provides a closer look into this. 
Are Foreign Banks Different During Crises Periods? 
This section provides an alternative comparison between domestic and foreign banks 
by discriminating between tranquil periods and episodes of financial distress. 
Arguably, the latter entail larger financial constraints for firms and banks, as well as 
changes in depositors’ behavior that may induce relocations of deposits toward larger 
or sounder banks. Therefore, potential asymmetries in financial constraints across 
domestic and foreign banks will tend to increase during crisis periods, especially if 
foreign banks are perceived as safer than domestic. The sample of countries included 
in this study offers a rich information set to address this issue, since half of the 
countries included suffered some type of financial crisis during the nineties. 
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To implement this exercise, three types of (related) crisis are considered: 
currency, banking, and debt crises. The definitions of each type of crises, and the 
series, are borrowed from previous studies. A first exercise exploits the currency and 
banking crises defined in Kamisnsky and Reinhart (1999),23 and the debt crises 
provided in Detriagache and Spilimbergo (2001).24 Each crisis variable is a dummy 
that takes the value of one at the crisis year and zero otherwise. 
A first pass at the evidence is provided with the help of a set of three-year 
crises windows, centered around years with a banking, currency, or debt crisis. The 
close relationship between these three types of crises—both within and between 
countries—tends to produce clustering, and therefore the size of the window exceeds 
the three-year period in many countries. For example, the Mexican currency crisis of 
1994 was preceded by a banking crisis in 1992, and therefore the crisis window in this 
case spans five years (1991-1995). Similarly, the Venezuelan currency crisis of 1994-
1995 was preceded by a banking crisis that started in 1993, and thus the crisis window 
                                                 
23 In Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), the dating of currency crises is based on an index 
of currency market turbulence, computed as a weighted average of exchange rate 
changes and reserve changes. A currency crisis occurs when the index reaches (or 
surpasses) three standard deviations above the mean. In turn, the onset of a banking 
crisis is defined by two types of events: (i) bank runs that lead to the closure, merging, 
or takeover by the public sector of one or more financial institutions; or (ii) if there are 
no runs, the closure, merging, takeover, or large-scale government assistance of an 
important financial institution (or group of institutions) that marks the start of a string 
of similar outcomes for other financial institutions. 
24 In Detriagache and Spilimbergo (2001), a debt crisis occurs when either (or both) of 
the following conditions occur: (i) there are arrears of principal or interest on external 
obligations towards commercial creditors (banks or bondholders) of more than 5 
percent of total commercial debt outstanding; (2) there is a rescheduling or debt 
restructuring agreement with commercial creditors as listed in the Global 
Development Finance (World Bank Debt Tables). 
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also spans over years (1992-1996). In other cases, such as Malaysia and Philippines 
during the 1997 Asian Crisis, the currency and banking crises occurred 
simultaneously, and the crisis window only covers three years (1996-1998). 
Figure 3 presents the behavior of loan growth across domestic and foreign 
banks for each country, both during crises and tranquil periods.25 The graphs illustrate 
two results. First, as expected, loan growth decreases sharply at the beginning of the 
crisis window and tend to recover toward the end. Second, the behavior of loan growth 
for domestic and foreign banks is remarkably similar both during crisis and tranquil 
periods. 
A more systematic test comparing the behavior of domestic and foreign banks 
across crisis and tranquil periods is performed by running panel regressions with bank-
level fixed effects similar to those presented above (i.e. splitting the sample of banks 
between domestic and foreign with the use of a dummy variable). The results, 
presented in Tables 25 and 26, are qualitatively similar for the Asian and Latin 
American sub-samples. The first two columns indicate that both loan and deposit 
growth decrease during crisis periods, with mild differences in loan growth in Latin 
America and significant differences in deposit growth (in the wrong direction) for 
Asia. The third column, that uses the ratio of loans to deposits as dependent variable, 
indicates that the proportion of loans financed though deposits does not change during 
crisis periods. In other words, changes in loans are matched one by one by changes in 
deposits both during crises and tranquil periods, for both domestic and foreign banks. 
                                                 
25 Loan growth was computed as the median taken over all banks operating in the 
same country in a given year. 
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The strongest differences across domestic and foreign banks during crisis 
periods are related to the behavior of interest rates, as indicated by the results shown in 
the last three columns. The regressions presented in the fifth and sixth columns 
indicate that bank-specific deposit and lending rates increase during crisis periods, and 
that the increase tends to be more moderate for foreign banks. The behavior of bank 
spreads during crisis periods is less conclusive (they increase for the sub-sample of 
Latin American countries but decrease for the sub-sample of Asian countries) but the 
results show no differences between domestic and foreign banks. 
A potential drawback of the above results is that they are obtained from a crisis 
window that may be too large (differences in the behavior of domestic and foreign 
banks may tend to disappear as the size of the crisis window increases). To address 
this concern, the same regressions are computed using a slightly richer set of crisis 
variables. Specifically, three sets of dummy variables are created to isolate potentially 
different behaviors around crisis episodes. The first variable, CRISIS T-1, equals one 
for the year preceding the crisis and zero otherwise, the second, CRISIS T, equals one 
in the year of the crisis and zero elsewhere, and the third, CRISIS T+1, equals one for 
the year immediately after the crises and zero otherwise. 
The results, displayed in the first two columns of Tables 27 and 28, indicate 
that both loan growth and deposit growth tend to be above average in the year 
preceding a crisis, and collapse at the onset of the crisis, There is evidence of stronger 
loan growth in T+1 for foreign banks in Latin America. For Asia, the differences 
between domestic and foreign banks are significant but in the wrong direction, 
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indicating a sharper contraction of both deposits and loans for foreign banks. Looking 
at the third column, the ratio of loans to deposits tends to decrease during and 
following crisis episodes, but the differences with tranquil periods are non significant. 
In other words, the data strongly indicate that loans and deposits move one for one for 
both domestic and foreign banks, at least at the yearly frequency. Going to the last 
three columns, the evidence indicates that lending rates increase one year before the 
crisis, and remain high thereafter (within the crisis window considered). Deposit rates, 
on the other hand, appear to react sluggishly, since they do not significantly increase 
during the year preceding the crises. Also, consistent with previous results, there is 
evidence that foreign banks show smaller increases in both lending and deposit rates, 
although the standard errors tend to be large due to the size of the crisis window. 
At first sight, the fact that loan and deposit growth do not significantly drop 
during the crisis years appears to be odd. This may be a consequence of the 
operational definition of crises used by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), since they 
identify the onset of crisis events, which are typically followed by broader and deeper 
periods of distress. To check this assertion, the same set of regressions is computed 
exploiting two alternative definitions of crises: the currency crashes of Frankel and 
Rose (1996), and the banking crises of Caprio and Kinglebiel (1996).26 Summary 
results of these regressions, provided in Tables 29 and 30, are roughly consistent with 
previous results, indicating higher loan growth before the crises and a significant drop 
                                                 
26 In Frankel and Rose (1996), a currency crash is a yearly depreciation of the 
exchange rate larger of equal to 25 percent, provided that it exceeds the depreciation 
of the previous year by at least 10 percent. 
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either at their onset, or immediately afterwards. More importantly, the previous 
conclusions are robust in the sense that, in general, no systematic differences in loan 
and deposit growth arise between domestic and foreign banks regardless of the 
operational definition of crisis employed. On the other hand, the behavior of deposit 
and lending rates tends to differ across domestic and foreign banks around crises 
periods. 
Concluding Remarks 
This chapter adds to the literature on the lending channel of monetary transmission by 
looking at the evidence from emerging economies. It uses a bank-level dataset 
covering more than 1,500 banks operating in 20 emerging countries during the 
nineties, to look for systematic differences in the response of selected balance sheet 
components to monetary conditions between domestic and foreign banks. The targeted 
balance sheet variables include loan growth, deposit growth, loan to deposit ratios, and 
bank-specific interest rates. The chapter argues that comparing the behavior of these 
variables across domestic and foreign banks provides an alternative way to test the 
lending channel hypothesis, if foreign banks are less financially constrained than 
domestic and if the behavior of loan demand does not systematically differ across the 
two groups of banks.  
Given the open-economy characteristics of the countries included in the 
sample, monetary conditions are measured by two sets of variables. The first group 
includes money market rates and reserve requirements, and the second includes 
international interest rates, exchange rate depreciation, and reserve requirements. 
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The results show a strong similarity in the response of loan growth to monetary 
conditions across domestic and foreign banks. In addition, the behavior of bank 
deposits and loan to deposit ratios is found to be markedly similar across these two 
groups of banks. These results can be interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, if one 
accepts that foreign banks are in fact less liquidity constrained than domestic banks, 
the results imply that supply-side effects in the credit market are nil. On the other, it 
may well be the case that supply-side effects exist without being properly captured by 
this test. This would be the case if foreign banks are not less financially constrained 
than domestic banks due, for example, to institutional arrangements that prevent them 
from freely getting upstream resources from their mother institutions. The latter 
interpretation appears to be plausible, since the results show systematic differences in 
the response of loan growth to monetary conditions across banks with different levels 
of liquidity and capitalization. 
At a more general level, the results strongly suggest that foreign bank 
participation in emerging countries has not led to increased instability in credit 
markets. Their response to the level of economic activity and to monetary conditions 
closely resembles that of domestic banks. Differences across domestic and foreign 
banks, if any, appear to be more related to the behavior of bank spreads and deposit 
rates. In particular, the results show that both deposit rates and bank spreads of foreign 
banks are less sensitive to monetary conditions, which suggests that foreign banks are 
in a relative better position to attract and retain deposits. This result opens the door to 





Appendix 1: Proofs of Propositions in Chapter 2 
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Similarly, plugging equation (5’) into (6) gives the equilibrium in the deposit market: 
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With F(b)=φ+φbb. These two equations, together with the balance sheet in equation (3) 
fully characterize the economy. Totally differentiating while keeping constant the 
bankruptcy costs, γ, and the bank's internal capital, k, gives:    
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Accordingly, exchange rate depreciation and/or an increase in foreign real interests 
induce a substitution of deposit by bond financing. The response of interest spreads 
follows directly from these results and equations (4’) and (5’). 
It can also be shown that, in the case of imperfect capital markets, the response 
of equilibrium loans to an increase in the foreign nominal rate expressed in local 





















      
 
A similar exercise with respect to reserve requirements shows that equilibrium bonds 










































       
On the other hand, the effect of an increase in reserves on equilibrium deposits cannot 
be signed. There are two forces at work. On the one hand, higher reserve requirements 
increase the effective cost of deposits and induce a substitution of deposit by bond 
financing. On the other, the increase in the bond spread together with the fall in 
loanable deposits tends to generate the opposite. The net effect depends on specific 
parameter configurations. Q.E.D. 
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Proof to Result 3: Plugging equation (9) into (3) and taking equations (8) and (1) gives 
a system of three equations. Totally differentiating while keeping constant the reserve 
requirements, δ, exchange rate depreciation, ε, the international interest rate, R*, gives: 
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With A=z1+(1-δ)2d1>0. So the dI/dγ>0 for a low value of γ.  Q.E.D. 
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Appendix 2: Construction of the Reserve Requirements Index 
This appendix states the criteria used in the construction of the reserve 





IF RESERVE REQUIREMENT (RR) IS:
BETWEEN 1% AND 15% : 1-2
BETWEEN 16% AND 30% : 2-3
BETWEEN 31% AND 70% : 3-4
BETWEEN 71% AND 100% : 4-5
SUB- CATEGORIES:
BETWEEN 1% AND 15% BETWEEN 16% AND 30% BETWEEN 31% AND 70% BETWEEN 71% AND 100% 
1.00% 1.00 16.00% 2.00 31% 3.00 71% 4.00
3.00% 1.20 19.50% 2.25 40% 3.25 80% 4.30
4.50% 1.30 23.00% 2.50 50% 3.50 85% 4.50
6.00% 1.40 25.00% 2.60 60% 3.75 90% 4.60
7.50% 1.50 26.50% 2.75 70% 3.99 100% 4.99
9.00% 1.60 29.00% 2.95




EXAMPLES THAT CAN BE EXTENDED FOR OTHER CASES:
9.00% 1.60 10.50% 1.70
9.25% 1.62 10.75% 1.72
9.50% 1.64 11.00% 1.74
9.75% 1.65 11.25% 1.75
10.00% 1.67 11.50% 1.77
10.25% 1.69 11.75% 1.79
10.50% 1.70 12.00% 1.80
II. HOW DO WE ASSIGN THE FINAL SCALE?
1) In each country case, we specify the kind of RR that has been chosen in order to assign the scale. In most cases, it is the RR 
on demand deposits (first criterium).
2) If during the year, there were more than one change in the reserve requirement, we weigh the scales reflecting the different RR 
percentages by the amount of months that they last.
3) In the case where  we do not have variation in the RR when look at the first criterium, we use a second criterium (specified in 
each country case) in order to assign the code. The number will be in red.
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Criteria Used in the Construction of the Index 
ARGENTINA
Firs t Criterium:
Marginal reserve requirements  until 1994
Minimum liquidity requirements  s ince 1995
Second Criterium:
Reserve requirements  for depos its  in foreign currency.
BOLIVIA
Firs t Criterium:
Reserve requirement on demand depos its  (domes tic currency).
BRAZIL
Firs t Criterium:
Reserve requirement on demand depos its  (domes tic currency).
Second Criterium:
Reserve requirements  for saving and time depos its  in domes tic currency, and
daily balance to be held in banking reserves .
CHILE
Firs t Criterium:
Reserve requirement on demand depos its  (foreing currency).
COLOMBIA
Firs t Criterium:
Reserve requirement on demand depos its  (domes tic currency).
Second Criterium:
Reserve requirements  for saving and time depos its  in domes tic currency.
INDIA
Firs t Criterium:
Cash reserve requirement on demand depos its  (domes tic currency).
Second Criterium:
Statutory liquidity ratio on demand and time liabilities .
INDONESIA
Firs t Criterium:
Statutory reserve requirement on demand depos its  (domestic currency).
Second Criterium:





Reserve requirement on demand deposits (domestic currency).
Second Criterium:
Marginal reserve requirement in domestic and foreign currency.
MALAYSIA
First Criterium:





Reserve requirement on demand deposits (domestic currency) until 1988.
liquidity coeffcient from 1989 to 1990
Second Criterium:
Liquidity coeffcient  for deposits in foreign currency  1991 to 1994
PARAGUAY
First Criterium:
Reserve requirement on demand deposits (domestic currency).
PERU
First Criterium:
Exigible reserve requirement (domestic currency).
Second Criterium:
Exigible reserve requirements for deposits in foreign currency.
PHILIPPINES
First Criterium:
Reserve requirement on demand deposits (domestic currency).
SINGAPORE
First Criterium:
Minimum cash balance on demand deposits (domestic currency).
TAIWAN
First Criterium:
Reserve requirement ratio on demand deposits (domestic currency).
Second Criterium:
The required reserve ratio for passbook saving deposits, time saving deposits and time deposits.
THAILAND
First Criterium:




Appendix 3: The Reserve Requirements Index 
ARGENTINA
Year Code Reserve Requirements
1986 4.580 The monetary system continued with a high average reserve requirement (including assets at the Central Bank) of 
around 20% and with its entities underexpanded on an average nearly 40%.
1987 4.580 As in 1986, reserve requirements were kept high: 89,5%  on demand deposits.  
1988 4.580 The average reserve requirement of the system by end October was above 78% of total amount of deposits at interest,
virtual nacionalization of deposits.
1989 4.500 The average reserve requirement of the system was 71% in June. There was a reduction of reserve requirements for
deposits in foreign currency.
1990 4.575 As from July, reserve requirements were reduced 3% in cases of technical reserves for general demand deposits and
by 1,5% additional for fixed period deposits. By September, the astringent monetary policy was further deepened, so
the backing figures returned to their previous high levels.
1991 4.555 In December, the Central Bank  reduced minimum cash requirements to  79% on demand deposits.
1992 4.120 There  were not substancial  variations in minimum cash requirements.  As of October 1 the Central Bank reduced by 2% 
the minimun cash requirement on peso deposits in current accounts and other sight and fixed term operations, at 71% .
1993 3.354 The Central Bank homogenized the reserve requirements for current accounts and sight operations in both
currencies, implying a substantial reduction in reserve requirements for current account in pesos from 71% to 40% .
In August, the Central Bank set a 3% increase, to 43%, in cash requirements on current account and saving deposits.
1994 3.300 The Central Bank reduced temporarily required minimums covering dollars deposits from 43% for sight deposits dated 
12-15-95, to 35% until 1-15-95. For fixed-term deposits the minimum cash requirement dropped from 3% to 1%  as of
12-16-94 to be reestablished at 3% as of 2-1-95.
1995 3.082 As of November 1995, reserve requirements have been replaced by minimum liquidity requirements (Requisitos Minimos
de Liquidez), which  may include earning assets. All deposits were subject to a uniform 15% liquidity requirement.
1996 2.100 The Central Bank increased the minimum liquidity requirement by 2%.
1997 2.200 The Central Bank increased the minimum liquidity requirement by 2% .
1998 2.300 The Central Bank increased the minimum liquidity requirement by 1% .
2001 2.188 In April, the Central Bank reduced the minimum liquidity requirement by 2%.
In June, the Central Bank established a new liquidity regime based on a minimum cash requirement over sight
operations, whereas the rules realted to minimum liquidity requirements only involved fixed term deposits.
Source:  Annual Report of the Argentine Economy- Economic Trends. Consejo Tecnico de Inversiones.
BOLIVIA
Year Code Reserve Requirements
1985 3.500 Central Bank reduced reserve requirements on demand deposits, saving deposits and time deposits, all in domestic currency.
From 60% to 50% in the case of demand deposits.
1986 3.250 Central Bank reduced reserve requirements on demand deposits, saving deposits and time deposits, all in domestic currency.
From 50% to 40% in the case of demand deposits.
1987 2.765 In July. Central Bank homogenized the reserve requirements to 20% for different types of deposits and currencies 
1994 1.975 In July, the Central Bank eliminated the marginal reserve requirement for deposits in domestic currency.
The marginal reserve requirement was 10% for demand and saving deposits, and 6% for time deposits (less than 365 days).
1998 1.757 In May, the Central Bank homogenized the reserve requirements to 12% for different types of deposits and currencies.




Year Code Reserve Requirements
1984 3.300 Central Bank increased reserve requirements from 10% to 22% for time deposits. The average reserve requirement on demand 
deposits was 43%.
1985 3.170 The rate of reserve requirements on demand deposits in the commercial banks dropped from an average  of 43% to 36%.
1988 3.180 Reserve requirements are rationalized, requirements differing according to bank size. As of December, the average, implicit,
reserve requirement represented 37% of deposits. 
1993 3.458 The percentage of the reserve requirement moved from 40%to 50% but had little impact on the banking  system's capacity to
grant credit, since demand deposits represent less than 1% of GDP.
1994 4.337 Under the Real Plan, the Central Bank raised the reserve requirement for demand deposits to 100% in June, which was reduced 
to 90% in December. The reserve requeriment for time deposits was raised from 20% to 30% in August and then reduced  to
27%  in December, and for the case of saving deposits the reserve requirement was raised from 20% to 30% in August.
1995 4.500 The reserve requirement for demand deposits was reduced from 90% to 83% in July, for time deposits the rate was reduced 
to 20% in August, and for saving deposits the rate was reduced to 15%.
1996 4.200 The criteria for reserve requirements and obligatory reserves on demand deposits were altered and a schedule was defined
according to which the rate would gradually decline from 83% to 78% as of December.
1997 4.150 In January, the reserve requirement for demand deposits was reduced from 78% to 75% .
1999 4.075 In October, the reserve requirement for demand deposits was reduced from 75% to 65% .
2000 3.538 The reserve requirement for demand deposits was reduced twice during the year to 55% in March and to 45% in June.
Source:  Annual Reports of the Central Bank of  Brazil (Banco Central do Brasil).
CHILE
Year Code Reserve Requirements
1.600 Reserve requirement (RR) for demand deposits  was 9,0%  in domestic currency.
1998 2.100 Reduction of reserve requirements to external credits from 30% to 10%.
In December, there was a reduction of reserve requirements to  deposits in foreign currency.  From 30% to 19% for  demand 
deposits, and from 30 to 13,6% for term deposits. 10% of reserve requirement in foreign currency were remunerated.
Source:  Annual Reports of the Central Bank of  Chile.
COLOMBIA
Year Code Reserve Requirements
1984 3.300 Monetary authority reduced the reserve requirement (RR) from 45%  to 43% over demand deposits.
1987 3.350 The RR of demand deposits was raised to 44%.
1988 3.250 The RR of demand deposits was reduced from 44% to 40%, and also it was reduced the RR of demand deposits with entities
of the public sector from 65% to 61%.
1989 3.230 The RR of demand deposits was reduced from 40% to 39%, and also it was reduced the RR of demand deposits with entities
of the public sector from 61% to 53%.
1990 3.100 The RR of demand deposits was reduced from 39% to 33.5%, and also it was reduced the RR of demand deposits with entities
of the public sector from 56% to 52.5%.
1991 3.280 In January, marginal reserve requirements of 100% are imposed on all new deposits. These reserves are held as interest-bearing
central bank bonds. In September, the marginal reserve requirement is replaced by an increase in reserve requirement on most 
deposits. RR of demand deposits was raised from 33.5% to 41% , and from 53.5% to 70% (public sector).
1992 3.260 The RR for saving deposits was reduced from 31% to 10%, and from 23% to 10% in the case of term deposits.
1995 3.250 RR of demand deposits was reduced from 41% to 40% , and from 70% to 60% (public sector). It was established a marginal 
reserve requirement (MRR) of 21% for demand deposits, and 10% for saving deposits and term deposits.
1996 2.350 It was homogenized the RR for deposits to 21%. The RR for term deposits was reduced to 5% and the MRR was reduced to 7%.
1998 2.292 In November, The RR for demand deposits was reduced to 16% and the MRR was reduced to 16%.
1999 1.870 The RR for demand deposits was reduced to 13% and the MRR was reduced to 13%.




Year Code Reserve Requirements
1987 3.550 The Bank of Mexico (BOM) reduced the marginal reserve requirement (MRR) from 77.2% to 51%.
The distribution was: 10% in cash, 35% in credits to the Federal Government, and 6% to development banks.
1988 3.500 The BOM determined liquidity coeffcients. 30% of liabilities (aceptaciones bancarias) had to be invested in remunerated demand 
deposits in the BOM and other securities (CETES, BONDES).
The distribution of MRR required investment was: 10% in cash, 31% in credits to the Federal Government, and 10% to 
development banks.
1989 2.990 Liquidity coefficient applied also to liabilities coming from traditional bank instruments. Pagares en dolares required a liquidity
coefficient of 30%.
1991 1.600 The BOM eliminated the existing liquidity coefficient on bank liabilities in domestic currency.
In June, the BOM in order to descourage the growth of foreign currency liabilities of commercial banks established a compulsory
liquidity coefficient of 50% to be constitued with liquid foreign assets.
In August, the BOM determined an ascendent scale of the liquidity coefficient from 0% to 50% depending on the maturity of 
deposits.
1992 1.200 In April, the liquidity coefficient, which went from 0% up to 50% according to the maturity of the deposits, was replaced by a
 15% requirement.
1995 1.300 In March, the BOM adopted a zero average legal reserve requirement: debtor balances posted at the close of each day in the 
current accounts of each credit institution with the BOM must be compensated, within 28-day periods, by posting, on other
days, creditor balances of at least equal amounts in the same accounts.
Source:  Annual Reports of the Central Bank of Mexico (Banco de Mexico).
PARAGUAY
Year Code Reserve Requirements
1991 3.330 Reserve Requirement (RR) on demand deposits in local currency was at 42%.
1992 2.990 The Central Bank reduced the  RR for domestic currency deposits to 30%.
In June, the Central Bank started to remunerate legal RR on local currency deposits.
1993 2.600 The CB reduced the RR on local currency deposits from 30% to 25%.
RR on foreign currency deposits was 30%.
1994 2.500 In September, the CB reduced the RR on local currency deposits from 25% to 18%.
In October, the CB started to remunerate legal RR on local currency deposits in excess of 10%.
Source:  Annual Reports of the Central Bank of Paraguay.
PERU
Year Code Reserve Requirements
1985 3.850 In August, The marginal reserve requirement (MRR) was raised from 50% to 75% for liabilities in domestic currency.
1986 3.760 The Central Bank reduced the MRR twice. As of  May the MRR was 70% for liabilities in domestic currency, and as October,
the MRR was 64%.
1987 3.580 In March, the Central bank reduced the MRR from 64% to 50% for liabilities in domestic currency captured out of Lima in order
to support credit descentralization.
1990 3.350 In June, the Central Bank homogenized and raised the MRR to 80%, but in August it came back to the initial scheme of 64% and
50%. In September, the Central Bank homogenized and reduced the MRR to 40% and then it was  reduced to 30%.
1991 2.600  In October, the MRR was reduced to 15%  and then reduced to 5% at the end of the year.
The exigible reserve requirement was reduced from 45% to 25,4% at the end of the year.
The Central Bank raised the MRR from 30% to 50% for liabilities in foreign currency.
1992 1.625 As of December, the exigible reserve requirement was at the level of 9,3%. There was a unification of the legal and exigible reserve 
requirement. In March, the MRR was reduced to 0% for domestic currency deposits.
1993 1.620 The Central Bank established a exigible reserve requirement of 9% for domestic currency, and  reduced the MRR from 50% to
45% for foreign currency.
1997 1.470 The Central Bank reduced the exigible reserve requirement to 7%
1998 1.470 The Central Bank reduced the average reserve requirement by 4.5% between October and December for liabilities in foreign 
currency. In December, the MRR in foreign currency was reduced from 35% to 20%.
2000 1.400 In September, the minimum reserve requirement was reduced from 7% to 6%, an a 1% minimum reserve requirement in the form
of demand deposits kept at the Central Bank was introduced.









Year Code Reserve Requirements
1991 1.870 The remunerated reserve requirement (RR) on sight deposits in local currency was 13%
1992 1.670 The RR on sight deposits in local currency was reduced to 10%
1993-2000 1.670 No changes.
Source: IMF Staff Country Reports.
VENEZUELA
Year Code Reserve Requirements
1990 1.927 In January, the CB unified the RR for demand, time and saving deposits to 12%. In May, the CB raised the RR to 15%.
1991 2.244 In May, the CB established a special RR of 80% on public sector deposits in commercial banks.
In August, the CB raised the RR on demand, savings and time deposits to 25% gradually.
1992 2.397 In September, the CB established that the RR for liabilities held until August 30 was 25%, and for liabilities after this date the
 RR was 15%. Also, the CB reduced the RR of  public sector deposits in commercial banks from 80% to 25% gradually.
In December, it was adjusted to 15%.
1993 1.990 In October, the CB unified the RR scheme. For commercial banks the RR was 15%.
1998 2.100 The RR was raised to 17%.
Source:  Annual Reports of the Central Bank of  Venezuela.
INDIA
Year Code Reserve Requirements
1987 1.644 In February, the cash reserve requirement (CRR) was raised from 9% to 9,5%.
In May, the CRR on FCNR deposit liabilities was raised from 3% to 9,5%.
In October, the CRR was raised from 9,5% to 10% of net demand and time liabilities.
1988 1.705 In July, the CRR was raised from 10% to 11% of net demand and time liabilities.
In July, the CRR on FCNR was raised from 9,5% to 10% .
1989 1.866 In July, CRR was homogenized at the level of 15% of the entire net demand and time liabilities.
1990 1.992 In September, SLR was raised from 38% to 38,5% of net demand and time liabilities.
1992 1.980 In April, SLR was reduced from 38,5% to 37,75% of net demand and time liabilities.
In April, banks were exempted from the mantainance of the 10% incremental CRR for any increase in net demand and time 
liabilities.
1993 1.973 In September, CRR was reduced from 15% to 14%.
1994 1.990 CRR was raised from 14% to 15%  in three phases. In October, it was stablished a CRR of 7,5% in respect of deposit liabilities 
under Foreign Currency (NR) Accounts (Banks).
1995 1.982 In January,  CRR of deposit liabilities under Foreign Currency (NR) was raised to 15%.
In November and December, the CRR was reduced from 15% to 14%.
1996 1.848 In May, the CRR was reduced from 14% to 13%.
In July, the CRR was reduced from13% to 12%.
In November, the CRR was reduced from12% to 11%.
1997 1.665 In January, the CRR was reduced from11% to 10%.
In April, liabilities to the banking system of all commercial banks were exempted from maintenance of CRR.
In October, the CRR was reduced from 10% to 9,75%.
1998 1.683 In March, the CRR was raised from 9,75% to 10,25%.
1999 1.675 In November, the CRR was reduced from 10,25% to 9%.









Year Code Reserve Requirements
1988 1.100 Reserve requirements were reduced from 15% to 2% of current liabilities.
1995 1.100 In December, the Bank of Indonesia (BOI) amended the regulation on the reserve requirement to statutory 
reserve requirement. With this newregulation, the reserve components changed from demand deposits
with BOI and cash originally, to only demand deposit with BOI.
1996 1.192 In February, the new regulation requiries commercial banks to maintain 3% of their funds in the form of 
demand deposit with the BOI.
1997 1.192 The statutory reserve requirement for foreign currencies deposits was reduced from 5% to 3%.
Source:  Annual Reports of the Bank of Indonesia.
KOREA
Year Code Reserve Requirements
1985 1.300 Reserve requirement (RR) for demand, time and saving deposits  was 4,5%  in domestic currency and 1% in foreign currency.
1987 1.328 In November, RR for demand, time and saving deposits  was raised to 7,0%  in domestic currency.
In February, the marginal reserve ratio  for resident account in foreign currency  was reduced to 4.5% .
1988 1.486 In December, RR for demand, time and saving deposits  was raised to 10,0%  in domestic currency.
1989 1.680 In May, a marginal reserve requirement (MRR) was introduced for deposits in domestic currency. It was 30%.
1990 1.762 In February, RR for demand, time and saving deposits  was raised to 11,5%  in domestic  currency.
In March, the marginal reserve ratio  for resident account in foreign currency  was raised to 11.5% .
1996 1.621 In April, RR for demand, time and saving deposits  was reduced to 9 %  in domestic currency
In April, the marginal reserve ratio  for resident account in foreign currency  was reduced to 9% .
In November, RR for demand, time and saving deposits  was reduced to 7 %  in domestic currency.
In November, the marginal reserve ratio  for resident account in foreign currency  was reduced to 7% .
1997 1.351 In February, RR for demand  deposits  was reduced to 5 %  in domestic currency. The RR for time ans saving
deposits  was reduced to 2 %  in domestic currency.
The BOK imposed a RR on negotiable certificates of deposits at 2%.
2000 1.340 In April, the MRR  for resident account in foreign currency (demand deposits)  was reduced to 5%. The MRR for resident 
account in foreign currency (time and saving deposits)  was reduced to 2% .
Source:  Annual Reports of the Bank of Korea. 
MALAYSIA
Year Code Reserve Requirements
1985 1.288 In April,  the statutory reserve requeriment (SRR) of commercial banks (CB) was reduced from 5% to 4% of total eligible liabilities.
For merchant banks (MB), the ratio was raised from 1.5% to 2.5%. The SRR for finance companies (FC) remain unchanged at 2.5%.
1986 1.263 In February, the SRR of FC and MB were increased from 2.5% to 3% .
In October, the SRR  for CB was reduced from 4% to 3,5%.
1987 1.238 The Central Bank reduced the liquidity ratio of CB from 10% to 8%, with the LR remaining unchanged at 17% for MB and FC.
1988 1.233 The Central Bank reduced the liquidity ratio of CB from 8% to 5%, and abolished the liquidity ratio for FC.
1989 1.298 In May, the Central Bank raised the SRR of CB, MB and FC to a uniform 4,5%.
In October, the Central Bank raised the SRR of CB, MB and FC to 5,5%.
1990 1.440 In January, the Central Bank raised the SRR of CB, MB and FC to 6,5%.
1991 1.465 In August, the Central Bank raised the SRR of CB, MB and FC to 7,5%.
1992 1.547 In May, the Central Bank raised the SRR of CB, MB and FC to 8,5%.
1994 1.715 In January, the Central Bank raised the SRR of CB, MB and FC to 9,5%.
In May, the Central Bank raised the SRR of CB, MB and FC to 10,5%.
In July, the Central Bank raised the SRR of CB, MB and FC to 11,5%.
1996 1.873 In February,  the Central Bank raised the SRR of CB, MB and FC to 12,5%.
In June,  the Central Bank raised the SRR of CB, MB and FC to 13,5%.
1998 1.521 In February,  the Central Bank reduced the SRR of CB, MB and FC from 13,5% to 10%.
In July,  the Central Bank reduced the SRR of CB, MB and FC from 10% to 8%.
In September,  the Central Bank reduced the SRR of CB, MB and FC from 8% to 4%.









Year Code Reserve Requirements
1985 2.540 In September, the reserve requirement (RR) against short-term deposit liabilities of commerical banks (CB) and thrift banks (TB)
was reduced from 24% to 23%.
1986 2.438 The RR on long-term deposit instruments of banks was reduced by a total of 2 percentage points from 23% to 21% in May and 
August.
1989 2.333 In September, the RR on deposits and deposit substitutes was homogenized to 20%.
1990 2.600 A series of upward adjustments in the RR on bank deposits were made during the year with a cummulative increase of 5 
percentage points from 20% in 1989 to 25% at the end of 1990 as a contractionary measure.
1993 2.300 A series of downward adjustments in the RR on bank deposits were made during the year with a cummulative reduction of 5
percentage points from 25% in 1992 to 20% at the end of 1993.
1994 2.100 The RR was reduced to 17%
1995 2.027 In May, the RR was reduced to 15%
1996 2.100 The RR was raised to 17%
1999 1.800 The RR was reduced during the year by a total of 5 percentage points from 17% in January to reach 12% by July.
Source:  Annual Reports of the Central Bank of Philippines, and IMF Staff  Country Reports (No. 97/28 and No. 95/113).
SINGAPORE
Year Code Reserve Requirements
1987 1.400 In May, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) reduced the minimum liquid asset ratio from 20% to 18%.
1997 1.300 In July, the MAS reduced the minimum cash balance (MCB) from 6% to 3%. The MCB was last  changed in 1975.
1998 1.330 The minimum liquid assets (MLA) requirement of finance companies was raised from 10% to 13%.
Source:  Annual Reports of the Monetary Authority of Singapore.
TAIWAN
Year Code Reserve Requirements
1978 2.990 The required reserve ratio (RRR) for checking accounts (CA) was 30%
1979 2.730 In May, the RRR for CA was reduced to 25%. 
1982 2.542 In June, the RRR for CA was reduced to 23%.
1988 2.508 In December, the RRR for CA was raised to 25%. 
1989 2.863 In April, the RRR for CA was raised to 29%. 
1990 2.929 In August, the RRR for CA was reduced to 28.5%. 
1991 2.867 In September, the RRR for CA was reduced to 27,75%.
1993 2.773 In September, the RRR for CA was reduced to 26,25%. 
1995 2.692 In November, the RRR for CA was reduced to 23,75%. 
1996 2.508 In August, the RRR for CA was reduced to 22%. 
1997 2.408 In October, the RRR for CA was reduced to 19,75%. 
1998 2.247 In September, the RRR for CA was reduced to 18,75%.
1999 2.006 In February, the RRR for CA was reduced to 15%. 
2000 1.975 In October, the RRR for CA was reduced to 13,5%. 
2001 1.855 In October, the RRR for CA was reduced to 10,75%. 
Source:  Annual Reports of the Central Bank of the Republic of China.
THAILAND
Year Code Reserve Requirements
1990 1.470 To stabilize the money markets and reduce fluctuations of short-term interest rates, the BOT modified commercial bank's reserve
 requirement computation procedure.
1995 1.480 In August, non-resident bath deposits with maturity of less than 1 year are subject to a 7% minimum reserve requirement in the 
form of deposits (with no interest) with the BOT. While reserve requirements on domestic deposits  are also 7%, they can be held 
in the form of  interest-beraring public bonds. 
1997 1.447 In September, the BOT reduced the liquidity requirement ratio from 7 % to 6% of total deposits.
For finance companies the liquidity requirement was reduced from 7% to 6% of total domestic and foreign borrowing.  Also, it 
was the case  for non-resident deposits or foreign borrowing with maturity of less than one year.
1999 1.440 The BOT announced new rules on liquidity reserve requirement composition and procedure, but not changes in rates.




Appendix 4: Algorithm to Track the Evolution of Bank Ownership 
Ideally, the objective is to identify foreign institutions involved in retail banking and 
with access to upstream financing from their mother banks.27 This is the case of 
branches of foreign banks, which can obtain resources from their mother institutions 
on a needed basis. This may also be the case of subsidiaries of foreign banks, although 
the availability of upstream resources in this case is not guaranteed. In this paper a 
bank is considered "foreign" if it is a branch of a bank incorporated in a foreign 
country, or if it has shareholders settled in a foreign country, holding together at least 
51 percent of the bank capital. 
The above operational definition was applied in four steps. First, the 
Bankscope search engine was used to identify subsidiaries of banks from OECD 
countries. Those with more than 51 percent of ownership in the hands of foreign banks 
were selected. This search identified 304 banks at least partially owned by banks from 
OECD countries. Of those, 189 had more than 51 percent in the hands of banks 
headquartered in OECD countries. Second, to verify the above list, the search engine 
of Bankscope was used to identify the shareholders of the sampled banks. Specifically, 
banks with shareholders settled in OECD countries, holding together at least 51 
percent of the bank capital were filtered. In cases with no available information on 
percentage ownership, banks with one or more shareholders from OECD countries, 
                                                 
27 In practice, both the nature of the services provided by foreign banks, and their 
access to upstream resources, depend on the institutional modality of entry. The most 
commonly used are representative offices, branches, subsidiaries, and joint ventures 
(for a description, see for example: IMF International Capital Markets: September 
2000, p. 159-160). 
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and with local shareholders holding together less than 50 percent of the bank's capital, 
were also selected. These filtering criteria produced 313 cases. Of those, 171 were 
common to the 189 mentioned above, and taken as foreign banks without further 
check. The remaining 18 were checked individually by looking at their web pages. All 
of them were included in the final list of foreign banks. 
Third, as the information on ownership is not available for all the banks 
included in the Bankscope database, a list of banks with unknown dependence was 
produced. The search matched 801 banks. This information was crossed out with a list 
of transnational banks headquartered in OECD countries or the Cayman Islands, 
gathered from the web site www.transnationale.org. In addition, the list of banks in the 
sample was intersected with the lists of foreign banks available from the Central 
Banks' web pages of Hong Kong, Brazil, Singapore, and Thailand. On a case-by-case 
basis, 168 additional branches of foreign banks were also identified. 
The list produced by the above criteria provides information on current 
ownership. In the fourth step, to obtain chronological information on changes in 
ownership throughout the period, the sample of banks was intersected with a 
comprehensive list of mergers and acquisitions targeting financial institutions in the 
sampled countries taken from the SDC Platinum database. Specifically, the list 
includes all transactions announced between January 1, 1985 and December 31, 2000, 
targeting institutions classified under industrial (SIC) codes 6000, 6081, 6029, 6021, 
and 6712 (to be on the safe side, these codes include a broad category of target 
financial institutions). The search produced 1,227 transactions involving 804 target 
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institutions. Of those, 404 were matched with the sample of banks. In order to track 
acquisitions by financial institutions exclusively, the list ignored operations were the 
acquirers and their nationalities were unknown. Using the description of each 
operation, nine categories were created, indicating the nationality of the buyer (foreign 
OECD, foreign non-OECD, government, domestic resident), and the resulting 
ownership position after the transaction (public, domestic, foreign OECD, and foreign 
non-OECD).28 With the help of this code, it was possible to replicate the evolution of 
bank ownership throughout the period. In total, the algorithm identified 58 institutions 







                                                 
28 In cases where the acquirer is a public company (there are several cases involving 




Table 1. Sample Description 








Brazil 9 71 1988-1997 61 1988-1997
Canada 13 100 1986-1998 103 1987-1998
Chile 6 21 1988-1997 5 1995-1997
Colombia 9 64 1987-1997 62 1988-1997
Denmark 38 328 1987-1998 99 1989-1998
Finland 8 59 1988-1997 41 1988-1996
France 52 466 1986-1997 29 1987-1997
Germany 42 361 1988-1998 4 1995-1998
Hong Kong 16 95 1988-1998 34 1986-1996
India 4 - - 9 1996-1998
Indonesia 12 72 1990-1997 66 1991-1997
Ireland 4 28 1988-1998 30 1988-1998
Italy 42 380 1986-1997 92 1987-1997
Japan 121 1028 1988-1998 96 1989-1998
Korea 20 119 1988-1997 46 1992-1997
Malaysia 19 120 1988-1997 100 1988-1998
Mexico 3 6 1992-1997 10 1992-1997
Norway 14 103 1988-1998 75 1988-1998
Peru 7 31 1988-1997 32 1988-1997
Philippines 12 75 1990-1997 61 1990-1997
Portugal 15 106 1986-1997 66 1988-1997
Spain 24 195 1986-1997 179 1987-1998
Taiwan 9 - 1993-1997 35 1993-1997
Thailand 30 204 1988-1997 108 1988-1997
United Kingdom 23 200 1986-1998 16 1988-1997
United States 266 2391 1986-1998 2263 1986-1998
Venezuela 4 25 1988-1997 26 1988-1997
Total 832 6648 3748
This table describes the sample of banks included in the WorldScope database. Available 
information includes balance sheets, income statements, and flows of funds. The sample covers 
only the largest publicly traded banks in each country. WorldScope reports both original figures, 
as published by banks, as well as figures that are adjusted to account for cross-country variations 





Table 2. Sample Distribution 







Developed countries 574                               1124 16.9
Developing countries 431                               206 3.1
40 th percentile
Developed countries 1,814                            1066 16.0
Developing countries 1,943                            264 4.0
60 th percentile
Developed countries 5,751                            1126 16.9
Developing countries 5,124                            203 3.1
80 th percentile
Developed countries 18,300                          1203 18.1
Developing countries 20,000                          127 1.9
100 th percentile
Developed countries 84,900                          1226 18.4
Developing countries 49,200                          103 1.5
Total sample 6648 100.0
Bank size (percentiles)
This table presents the sample distribution by quintiles of bank size and by developed and developing 
countries. Bank size is measured by total assets in constant 1995 US$. Quintiles are computed based 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































GDP Growth 0.464 *** 0.589 ***
(0.117) (0.17)
Lag. liquidity 0.443 *** 0.196 ***
(0.034) (0.044)
Developing*Lag. liquidity 0.599 *** 0.848 ***
(0.176) (0.178)
Log assets 0.107 *** 0.204 ***
(0.012) (0.021)
Developing*Log assets -0.133 *** -0.228 ***
(0.049) (0.051)
Panel A: Reserve requirements
Reserve Requirements -0.199 * -0.263 **
(0.115) (0.124)
Developing*Reserve Requirements 0.273 0.34
(0.274) (0.278)
Log assets*Reserve Requirements 0.012 * 0.015 **
(0.007) (0.008)
Developing*Log assets*Reserve Requirements -0.012 -0.015
(0.018) (0.018)
Dummy Cost Debt*Reserve Requirements 0.001 -0.006
(0.008) (0.009)
Developing*Dummy Cost Debt*Reserve Requirements 0.013 0.019
(0.029) (0.029)
Panel B: Money Market Rates
Money Market Rate -0.024 *** 0.032 **
(0.009) (0.013)
Developing*Money Market Rate -0.074 ** -0.129 ***
(0.029) (0.031)
Log assets*Money Market Rate 0.002 *** -0.0003
(0.001) (0.001)
Developing*Log assets*Money Market Rate 0.003 0.006 ***
(0.002) (0.002)
Dummy Cost Debt*Money Market Rate -0.004 ** -0.003
(0.002) (0.002)
Developing*Dummy Cost Debt*Money Market Rate -0.018 *** -0.017 ***
(0.005) (0.005)
No. Obs. 3838 2010
R-Sq. 0.188 0.2546
This table presents the results of fixed effect regressions of loan growth on money market rates and an indicator of 
reserve requirements. Loan growth is the yearly change in loans measured in constant (1995) local currency. 
Reserve requirements are an indicator variable ranging from 1 to 3, where a higher value means higher levels of 
required reserves. Dummy cost of debt is a dummy variable that equals one for bank-years whose interest rates on 
non-insured debt are above the 75th percentile relative to their country-year peers. Column [1] reports the results 
based on the whole sample of countries; column [2] excludes US banks. The data used in the regressions comes 




Table 8. Loan Growth, Reserve Requirements, Treasury Bill Rates, and Depreciation 
All sample Excluding US banks
Panel A: Reserve Requirements
Reserve Requirements -0.140 ** -0.167 *
(0.072) (0.100)
Reserve Requirements * Developing -0.037 -0.011
(0.232) (0.225)
Ln Assets * Reserve Requirements 0.011 * 0.012 **
(0.006) (0.006)
Ln Assets * Reserve Requirements * Developing 0.003 0.002
(0.015) (0.015)
Reserve Requirements * Dummy Cost of Debt -0.006 -0.004
(0.009) (0.011)
Reserve Requirements * Dummy Cost Debt * Developing -0.080 *** -0.082 ***
(0.030) (0.030)
Panel B: Treasury Bill Rate
Treasury Bill Rate -0.005 0.002
(0.011) (0.018)
Treasury Bill Rate * Developing 0.000 -0.005
(0.083) (0.081)
Ln Assets * Treasury Bill Rate 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Ln Assets * Treasury Bill Rate * Developing 0.000 0.000
(0.005) (0.005)
Treasury Bill Rate * Dummy Cost of Debt 0.007 0.004
(0.005) (0.004)
Treasury Bill Rate * Dummy Cost Debt * Developing -0.020 -0.023 *
(0.013) (0.013)
Panel C: Exchange Rate Depreciation
Depreciation -0.199 -0.283
(0.291) (0.284)
Depreciation * Developing -5.938 *** -5.870 ***
(1.238) (1.191)
Ln Assets * Depreciation 0.017 0.021
(0.017) (0.017)
Ln Assets * Depreciation * Developing 0.382 *** 0.377 ***
(0.081) (0.078)
Depreciation * Dummy Cost of Debt -0.186 ** -0.186 ***
(0.073) (0.070)
Depreciation * Dummy Cost Debt * Developing -1.259 *** -1.264 ***
(0.304) (0.292)
R-Sq 0.158 0.150
No. Obs. 4145.000 2224.000
This table presents the results of fixed effect regressions of loan growth on an indicator of reserve requirements, the 
rate of the 3 month US treasury bills, and exchange rate depreciation. Control variables include GDP growth and 
lagged bank liquidity (cash and liquid assets over total assets). Loan growth is the yearly change in loans measured in 
constant (1995). Reserve requirements are an indicator variable that goes from 1 to 3, where a higher value means 
higher levels of required reserves. Dummy Cost of Debt is a dummy variable that equals one for bank-years whose 
interest rates  are above the 75th percentile relative to their country-year peers. Column [1] reports the results based 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Central Bank reports and International Financial Statistics. 
For countries with incomplete or not available information on money market rates, an 
alternative indicator was used. The call money rate (series 60) was used for India; the 





































































































Source: Central Bank reports and International Financial Statistics. 
For countries with incomplete or not available information on money market rates, an 
alternative indicator was used. Deposit rates (series 60L) were used for Bolivia, Chile, 






















































This Figure presents the evolution of loan growth in constant local currency units for 
domestic and foreign banks. For each country, loan growth is computed as the median 
across sampled banks. A crisis window, covering a three-year period around either a 





Table 10. Sample Coverage by Regions and Bank Ownership 
Asia Latin America Total Observations
Domestic Foreign Total Domestic Foreign Total Freq. Percent Cum.
1989 . . 0 2 1 3 3 0.03 0.03
1990 9 2 11 9 3 12 23 0.27 0.30
1991 28 5 33 20 3 23 56 0.65 0.96
1992 84 31 115 42 13 55 170 1.98 2.94
1993 280 101 381 159 96 255 636 7.42 10.36
1994 366 132 498 294 157 451 949 11.07 21.43
1995 424 164 588 321 195 516 1104 12.88 34.30
1996 452 182 634 346 212 558 1192 13.90 48.20
1997 411 189 600 329 220 549 1149 13.40 61.60
1998 399 190 589 336 241 577 1166 13.60 75.20
1999 365 172 537 335 235 570 1107 12.91 88.12
2000 281 142 423 319 250 569 992 11.57 99.69
2001 5 1 6 14 7 21 27 0.31 100.00
Total 3104 1311 4415 2526 1633 4159 8574 100
This table shows the temporal distribution of the bank-level data. The sample comes from the BankScope database, and covers 





Table 11. Balance Sheet Structure by Regions and Quintiles of Bank Size 
Asian Latin America
Quintiles of bank size 0-20 20-40 40-60 60-80 80-100 0-20 20-40 40-60 60-80 80-100
Total loans 50.8 51.5 52.2 57.8 60.4 51.5 54.7 53.2 47.9 50.0
Problem loans 3.0 3.8 2.0 2.7 3.8 3.1 2.4 2.1 2.4 4.7
Loan loss reserves 4.9 2.6 1.6 1.7 1.6 4.5 3.1 2.6 2.2 3.0
Net Loans 45.9 49.1 50.7 56.4 59.2 48.1 52.9 51.7 47.1 49.8
Deposits with banks 16.6 13.2 11.9 9.2 11.4 10.4 9.0 8.6 7.0 4.8
Securities 14.8 12.4 14.5 13.8 10.4 15.9 15.2 18.0 21.6 18.7
Equity investment 5.0 7.4 6.1 2.6 1.9 2.8 2.4 1.8 2.5 3.4
Total other earning assets 44.2 43.0 41.5 34.8 30.7 33.1 31.4 33.6 36.9 34.6
Total non-earning assets 7.2 6.2 5.8 6.6 7.9 13.9 12.2 11.5 13.3 12.9
Fixed assets 2.7 1.7 2.0 2.2 2.2 4.9 3.5 3.2 2.7 2.6
Total assets 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Total deposits 53.8 59.1 61.2 72.6 76.8 58.9 66.7 65.8 59.3 56.1
Money Market Funding 9.6 8.2 8.4 4.7 3.6 8.0 9.3 12.0 14.8 16.4
Other Funding 3.5 4.9 8.5 4.7 6.1 2.0 2.8 4.0 6.5 9.7
Other liabilities 5.5 5.4 5.3 6.5 6.8 6.0 5.9 6.5 8.6 9.0
Total liabilities 72.4 77.6 83.4 88.6 93.2 75.0 84.8 88.2 89.2 91.2
Equity 27.6 22.5 16.6 11.4 6.7 25.0 15.2 11.8 10.8 8.8
Total liabilities and equity 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
No. Observations 578 761 888 972 1204 1131 948 821 737 504
Median Assets (million 1995 US$) 58 210 489 1,591 6,351 50 199 486 1,443 6,392
Mean Assets (million 1995 US$) 58 212 517 1,685 12,615 54 203 512 1,561 11,498
Other earning assets include due from Central Banks, deposits with banks, bonds, securities, and equity investments. Total deposits include demand deposits, saving 




Table 12. Summary Statistics by Regions and Bank Ownership 
Domestic Banks Foreign Banks
Mean Median Max. Min. Obs. Mean Median Max. Min. Obs.
A) Asia
Loan Growth 11.2 10.5 240.4 -128.6 1016 5.1 8.3 218.2 -206.9 238
Deposit Growth 11.0 9.3 215.7 -183.8 1003 8.3 8.4 216.2 -108.1 238
Net Loans/Total Deposits 81.8 75.9 484.0 21.1 1217 88.8 80.7 465.0 22.0 289
Net Loans/Total Assets 56.1 57.4 87.1 11.8 1232 54.5 58.0 87.0 10.0 291
Other Earning Assets/Total Assets 31.4 28.5 78.4 5.2 1231 32.7 30.0 75.9 6.1 292
Non Earning Assets/Total Assets 9.9 8.0 74.4 5.0 1234 11.2 8.3 71.2 5.0 293
Total Deposits/Total Assets 75.2 79.5 94.9 5.2 1219 68.9 74.8 94.9 7.2 291
Money Market Funding/Total Assets 4.1 0.9 77.2 0.0 1180 4.4 0.0 73.3 0.0 275
Total Liabilities/Total Assets 90.1 92.3 99.7 40.9 1234 86.1 89.9 99.8 40.3 293
Net Worth/Total Assets 9.9 7.7 59.1 0.3 1234 13.9 10.1 59.7 0.2 293
Efective Bank Spread 3.8 3.8 19.0 -14.9 979 5.1 3.7 135.3 -4.4 215
B) Latin America
Loan Growth 3.4 5.0 202.4 -237.0 1224 8.0 7.0 247.9 -209.2 681
Deposit Growth 3.6 5.3 229.8 -236.6 1227 5.4 5.8 196.2 -181.8 682
Net Loans/Total Deposits 89.0 80.4 494.1 20.1 1562 89.1 81.2 478.3 20.6 809
Net Loans/Total Assets 52.5 54.6 86.3 10.2 1568 50.4 53.0 87.8 10.1 812
Other Earning Assets/Total Assets 28.4 25.7 79.5 5.0 1576 31.1 26.8 78.8 5.0 822
Non Earning Assets/Total Assets 14.7 12.4 75.0 5.0 1576 16.0 13.1 77.4 5.0 822
Total Deposits/Total Assets 65.2 69.7 93.7 5.4 1568 62.7 69.8 94.9 5.5 818
Money Market Funding/Total Assets 9.0 2.2 64.3 0.0 1351 12.5 3.3 74.1 0.0 745
Total Liabilities/Total Assets 85.1 87.8 99.9 40.0 1576 86.5 89.4 99.9 40.2 822
Net Worth/Total Assets 14.9 12.2 60.0 0.1 1576 13.5 10.6 59.8 0.1 822
Efective Bank Spread 8.9 7.0 82.2 -19.6 1205 7.8 6.0 101.4 -31.0 670
B) Whole Sample
Loan Growth 6.9 8.0 240.4 -237.0 2240 7.2 7.5 247.9 -209.2 919
Deposit Growth 6.9 7.7 229.8 -236.6 2230 6.1 6.3 216.2 -181.8 920
Net Loans/Total Deposits 85.8 78.7 494.1 20.1 2779 89.0 81.1 478.3 20.6 1098
Net Loans/Total Assets 54.1 55.6 87.1 10.2 2800 51.5 54.4 87.8 10.0 1103
Other Earning Assets/Total Assets 29.7 26.7 79.5 5.0 2807 31.5 27.7 78.8 5.0 1114
Non Earning Assets/Total Assets 12.6 9.7 75.0 5.0 2810 14.8 11.5 77.4 5.0 1115
Total Deposits/Total Assets 69.6 74.6 94.9 5.2 2787 64.3 71.0 94.9 5.5 1109
Money Market Funding/Total Assets 6.7 1.1 77.2 0.0 2531 10.3 1.2 74.1 0.0 1020
Total Liabilities/Total Assets 87.3 89.6 99.9 40.0 2810 86.4 89.5 99.9 40.2 1115
Net Worth/Total Assets 12.7 10.4 60.0 0.1 2810 13.6 10.5 59.8 0.1 1115
Efective Bank Spread 6.6 4.7 82.2 -19.6 2184 7.1 5.2 135.3 -31.0 885
This table presents summary statistics of selected variables for domestic and foreign banks, and by regions.  
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Table 13. Fixed Effects Regressions of Selected Variables on Monetary Conditions, 
Latin-American Sub-Sample 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Loan Growth Deposit Growth Loans/Deposits Bank Spread Deposit Rate Lending Rate
Controls
GDP Growth 1.647 1.097 -0.041 0.112 -0.293 -0.054
[0.302]*** [0.301]*** [0.996] [0.049]** [0.101]*** [0.060]
Foreign*GDP Growth 0.276 -0.224 -1.805 -0.022 -0.022 -0.149
[0.458] [0.473] [1.559] [0.081] [0.108] [0.106]
Size 0.256 0.299 -0.292 -0.016 0.003 -0.009
[0.033]*** [0.032]*** [0.181] [0.005]*** [0.005] [0.006]
Foreign*Size 0.006 0.044 0.109 0.003 -0.009 -0.009
[0.041] [0.039] [0.155] [0.006] [0.005]* [0.008]
Liquidity (t-1) 0.694 -0.045 -1.457 -0.064 -0.090 -0.098
[0.148]*** [0.128] [0.669]** [0.018]*** [0.041]** [0.027]***
Foreign*Liquidity (t-1) 0.383 0.074 1.325 0.110 0.045 0.104
[0.216]* [0.206] [0.734]* [0.035]*** [0.045] [0.048]**
Capitalization (t-1) 1.205 2.194 -1.950 -0.021 0.082 0.091
[0.309]*** [0.308]*** [1.693] [0.034] [0.046]* [0.055]*
Foreign*Capitalization (t-1) 1.056 1.002 2.361 0.065 -0.036 -0.005
[0.477]** [0.465]** [1.791] [0.065] [0.055] [0.086]
Monetary Conditions
Reserve Requirements -0.127 -0.080 -0.063 0.000 0.023 0.004
[0.038]*** [0.038]** [0.139] [0.005] [0.016] [0.007]
Foreign*Reserve Requirements -0.029 -0.071 0.319 -0.023 -0.007 -0.013
[0.070] [0.093] [0.285] [0.009]** [0.017] [0.012]
Money Market Rate -0.051 -0.058 -0.001 0.273 0.203 0.494
[0.004]*** [0.003]*** [0.004] [0.026]*** [0.037]*** [0.042]***
Foreign*Money Market Rate -0.001 0.001 -0.005 -0.003 -0.102 -0.111
[0.007] [0.008] [0.007] [0.044] [0.043]** [0.065]*
Observations 3019 3055 3020 2881 2938 2889
R-squared 0.49 0.46 0.55 0.87 0.61 0.74
This table presents the results of panel regressions with bank-level fixed effects. The sample comes from the Bankscope database and covers banks operating in 
selected Latin American countries from 1989-2001. Robust standard errors are reported between square brackets. Statistical significance at one, five, and ten 
percent level, are indicated by ***, **, *, respectively. Six models are considered, each one presented in a separate column. Each model uses a different dependent 
variable, specified in the first row of the table. All models share the same set of explanatory variables, including country-level controls (GDP growth), bank-level 
controls (bank size, bank liquidity, and bank capitalization), and two indicators of monetary conditions (an index that tracks the evolution of reserve requirements, 









Table 14. Fixed Effects Regressions of Selected Variables on Monetary Conditions, 
Asian Sub-Sample 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Loan Growth Deposit Growth Loans/Deposits Bank Spread Deposit Rate Lending Rate
Controls
GDP Growth 2.283 1.512 0.644 0.140 -0.117 0.017
[0.210]*** [0.268]*** [0.725] [0.023]*** [0.018]*** [0.024]
Foreign*GDP Growth -0.038 0.912 -0.414 -0.073 0.082 0.020
[0.370] [0.386]** [1.618] [0.044]* [0.027]*** [0.053]
Size 0.172 0.240 0.114 -0.006 -0.002 -0.008
[0.036]*** [0.036]*** [0.118] [0.003]** [0.002] [0.003]**
Foreign*Size 0.115 0.211 0.430 0.005 0.000 0.005
[0.054]** [0.055]*** [0.316] [0.006] [0.003] [0.007]
Liquidity (t-1) 0.638 -0.138 -1.830 -0.031 -0.023 -0.061
[0.137]*** [0.094] [0.628]*** [0.011]*** [0.007]*** [0.013]***
Foreign*Liquidity (t-1) 0.294 0.470 -0.664 0.025 0.006 0.035
[0.225] [0.206]** [1.874] [0.061] [0.017] [0.074]
Capitalization (t-1) 0.934 1.230 0.421 0.029 -0.011 0.020
[0.198]*** [0.213]*** [0.668] [0.031] [0.008] [0.030]
Foreign*Capitalization (t-1) 0.109 0.269 0.326 0.014 0.039 0.052
[0.392] [0.444] [0.853] [0.040] [0.017]** [0.044]
Monetary Conditions
Reserve Requirements 0.073 0.139 -0.066 -0.001 0.012 0.011
[0.063] [0.086] [0.273] [0.009] [0.006]** [0.010]
Foreign*Reserve Requirements -0.297 -0.384 -0.086 -0.001 -0.013 -0.013
[0.146]** [0.151]** [0.430] [0.014] [0.012] [0.018]
Money Market Rate -0.701 0.040 -0.597 -0.045 0.256 0.206
[0.162]*** [0.164] [0.393] [0.020]** [0.019]*** [0.020]***
Foreign*Money Market Rate 0.529 -0.112 -1.356 0.092 -0.150 -0.053
[0.225]** [0.237] [1.025] [0.036]*** [0.024]*** [0.041]
Observations 3339 3322 3267 2953 3047 2962
R-squared 0.51 0.40 0.71 0.92 0.95 0.90
This table presents the results of panel regressions with bank-level fixed effects. The sample comes from the Bankscope database and covers banks operating in 
selected Latin American countries from 1989-2001. Robust standard errors are reported between square brackets. Statistical significance at one, five, and ten 
percent level, are indicated by ***, **, *, respectively. Six models are considered, each one presented in a separate column. Each model uses a different dependent 
variable, specified in the first row of the table. All models share the same set of explanatory variables, including country-level controls (GDP growth), bank-level 
controls (bank size, bank liquidity, and bank capitalization), and two indicators of monetary conditions (an index that tracks the evolution of reserve requirements, 






Table 15. GLS Estimates of Selected Variables on Monetary Conditions, Latin-
American Sub-Sample 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Loan Growth Deposit Growth Loans/Deposits Bank Spread Deposit Rate Lending Rate
Controls
GDP Growth 2.016 1.695 0.938 0.011 -0.129 -0.107
[0.369]*** [0.391]*** [1.838] [0.047] [0.065]** [0.075]
Foreign*GDP Growth -0.329 -0.063 -2.619 -0.039 -0.111 -0.108
[0.582] [0.614] [2.906] [0.072] [0.100] [0.115]
Size 0.316 0.377 -0.242 -0.005 0.002 -0.008
[0.032]*** [0.032]*** [0.185] [0.004] [0.005] [0.007]
Foreign*Size 0.008 0.011 0.068 0.000 -0.007 -0.006
[0.040] [0.040] [0.239] [0.006] [0.007] [0.009]
Liquidity (t-1) 0.837 -0.043 -1.052 -0.036 -0.048 -0.068
[0.127]*** [0.129] [0.686] [0.016]** [0.022]** [0.025]***
Foreign*Liquidity (t-1) 0.046 -0.210 1.796 0.005 -0.002 -0.010
[0.188] [0.190] [1.022]* [0.025] [0.032] [0.039]
Capitalization (t-1) 1.109 2.178 -1.351 -0.065 0.050 0.026
[0.212]*** [0.215]*** [1.058] [0.025]** [0.035] [0.040]
Foreign*Capitalization (t-1) 0.704 1.337 0.386 0.039 -0.017 -0.015
[0.376]* [0.378]*** [1.950] [0.047] [0.063] [0.075]
Monetary Conditions
Reserve Requirements -0.088 -0.028 0.048 -0.001 -0.002 -0.004
[0.043]** [0.047] [0.204] [0.005] [0.007] [0.008]
Foreign*Reserve Requirements 0.007 -0.046 0.227 -0.017 0.029 0.014
[0.082] [0.088] [0.394] [0.010]* [0.014]** [0.015]
Money Market Rate -0.042 -0.055 0.000 0.106 0.233 0.388
[0.006]*** [0.007]*** [0.029] [0.028]*** [0.039]*** [0.045]***
Foreign*Money Market Rate 0.056 0.399 -0.013 0.070 0.026 0.107
[0.034]* [0.102]*** [0.065] [0.039]* [0.050] [0.061]*
Observations 2317 2350 2324 2194 2235 2197
Groups 591 599 593 582 595 584
R. Sq. 0.17 0.22 0.00 0.04 0.07 0.13
Rho AR(1) 0.18 0.06 0.55 0.42 0.09 0.31
This table presents the results of GLS panel regressions with bank-level fixed effects, and allowing for panel-specific AR(1) errors. The sample comes from the 
Bankscope database and covers banks operating in selected Latin American countries from 1989-2001. Robust standard errors are reported between square 
brackets. Statistical significance at one, five, and ten percent level, are indicated by ***, **, *, respectively. Six models are considered, each one presented in a 
separate column. Each model uses a different dependent variable, specified in the first row of the table. All models share the same set of explanatory variables, 
including country-level controls (GDP growth), bank-level controls (bank size, bank liquidity, and bank capitalization), and two indicators of monetary conditions 
(an index that tracks the evolution of reserve requirements, and the money market rate). The sample is split across domestic and foreign banks with the use of a 
dummy ("Foreign") which equals one for foreign banks and zero otherwise.
  
110 
Table 16. GLS Regressions of Selected Variables on Monetary Conditions, Asian Sub-
Sample 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Loan Growth Deposit Growth Loans/Deposits Bank Spread Deposit Rate Lending Rate
Controls
GDP Growth 1.906 1.364 -0.101 0.073 -0.099 -0.027
[0.238]*** [0.268]*** [1.260] [0.026]*** [0.018]*** [0.031]
Foreign*GDP Growth 0.389 1.202 -0.944 0.004 0.071 0.063
[0.351] [0.393]*** [1.887] [0.040] [0.028]** [0.048]
Size 0.281 0.315 0.126 0.001 -0.002 0.000
[0.032]*** [0.035]*** [0.193] [0.004] [0.002] [0.005]
Foreign*Size 0.127 0.209 0.303 0.009 -0.001 0.005
[0.044]*** [0.047]*** [0.264] [0.005] [0.003] [0.006]
Liquidity (t-1) 0.856 -0.224 -1.537 -0.025 -0.036 -0.066
[0.107]*** [0.119]* [0.646]** [0.013]* [0.008]*** [0.015]***
Foreign*Liquidity (t-1) 0.309 0.595 0.602 -0.010 0.011 0.016
[0.171]* [0.189]*** [1.005] [0.021] [0.013] [0.025]
Capitalization (t-1) 0.870 0.924 0.365 0.047 -0.013 0.033
[0.138]*** [0.156]*** [0.806] [0.015]*** [0.010] [0.018]*
Foreign*Capitalization (t-1) 0.045 0.544 -0.221 -0.032 0.046 -0.002
[0.216] [0.238]** [1.257] [0.024] [0.015]*** [0.029]
Monetary Conditions
Reserve Requirements -0.033 0.111 -0.091 0.001 0.023 0.011
[0.089] [0.099] [0.473] [0.009] [0.006]*** [0.011]
Foreign*Reserve Requirements -0.352 -0.329 -0.064 -0.011 -0.026 -0.025
[0.196]* [0.219] [1.039] [0.021] [0.014]* [0.025]
Money Market Rate -0.793 -0.005 -1.245 -0.063 0.254 0.200
[0.177]*** [0.195] [0.998] [0.019]*** [0.013]*** [0.023]***
Foreign*Money Market Rate 0.569 -0.169 0.052 0.094 -0.158 -0.052
[0.260]** [0.288] [1.435] [0.029]*** [0.019]*** [0.034]
Observations 2631 2623 2582 2308 2380 2314
Groups 627 628 613 571 593 573
R. Sq. 0.26 0.17 0.01 0.04 0.40 0.15
Rho AR(1) 0.15 0.02 0.45 0.40 -0.01 0.42
This table presents the results of GLS panel regressions with bank-level fixed effects, and allowing for panel-specific AR(1) errors. The sample comes from the 
Bankscope database and covers banks operating in selected Latin American countries from 1989-2001. Robust standard errors are reported between square 
brackets. Statistical significance at one, five, and ten percent level, are indicated by ***, **, *, respectively. Six models are considered, each one presented in a 
separate column. Each model uses a different dependent variable, specified in the first row of the table. All models share the same set of explanatory variables, 
including country-level controls (GDP growth), bank-level controls (bank size, bank liquidity, and bank capitalization), and two indicators of monetary conditions 
(an index that tracks the evolution of reserve requirements, and the money market rate). The sample is split across domestic and foreign banks with the use of a 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
 
 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Money Market Rate 0.58 0.99 0.35 0.25 0.24
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.011)
[103] [103] [113] [96] [114]
Real Interest rate 0.37 0.52 0.51 0.27 -0.06
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.516)
[74] [103] [103] [87] [103]
Inflation 0.85 -0.18 0.93 0.33 -0.20
(0.000) (0.125) (0.000) (0.001) (0.044)
[74] [74] [104] [88] [105]
Depreciation 0.75 0.18 0.69 0.40 0.08
(0.000) (0.118) (0.000) (0.000) (0.374)
[82] [74] [82] [95] [114]
Reserve Requirements 0.01 -0.10 -0.07 -0.04 0.07
(0.950) (0.412) (0.550) (0.756) (0.513)
[71] [64] [72] [79] [97]
US Federal funds rate 0.10 0.13 -0.05 0.01 -0.08
(0.376) (0.286) (0.668) (0.910) (0.454)
[82] [74] [85] [90] [80]
The upper triangle shows the pairwise correlations for the Latin American countries in the sample, and the lower 
triangle corresponds to Asian countries. The significance level of rejecting the null of no correlation is in parenthesis, 
and the number of observetions is in square brakets.
 
 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
 
 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 26. Latin America, Regressions Using a Crisis Window 





Deposits Bank Spread Deposit Rate Lending Rate
Bank-level controls
Size 0.2270 0.2710 -0.3110 -0.0130 0.0120 0.0010
[0.039]*** [0.038]*** [0.190] [0.004]*** [0.005]** [0.007]
Foreign*Size 0.0220 0.0570 0.1010 0.0000 -0.0100 -0.0130
[0.053] [0.052] [0.154] [0.006] [0.006]* [0.009]
Liquidity (t-1) 0.6740 -0.0860 -1.6310 -0.0550 -0.0770 -0.0830
[0.155]*** [0.139] [0.778]** [0.019]*** [0.036]** [0.029]***
Foreign*Liquidity (t-1) 0.4110 0.1140 1.5120 0.1090 0.0400 0.1050
[0.223]* [0.217] [0.836]* [0.036]*** [0.042] [0.050]**
Capitalization (t-1) 1.2380 2.2150 -1.9040 -0.0030 0.0800 0.1170
[0.325]*** [0.320]*** [1.677] [0.035] [0.048]* [0.060]*
Foreign*Capitalization (t-1) 0.8360 0.7930 2.3640 0.0550 -0.0410 -0.0240
[0.527] [0.520] [1.791] [0.065] [0.056] [0.089]
Target variables
Dummy Crises -0.0980 -0.1380 -0.2770 0.0300 0.0370 0.0580
[0.038]*** [0.038]*** [0.209] [0.005]*** [0.011]*** [0.008]***
Foreign*Dummy Crises 0.1340 0.0710 0.0700 -0.0040 -0.0290 -0.0270
[0.070]* [0.081] [0.259] [0.011] [0.014]** [0.015]*
Constant 0.0220 0.0260 1.1860 0.0710 0.1210 0.1930
[0.014] [0.012]** [0.055]*** [0.002]*** [0.003]*** [0.002]***
Observations 3019 3055 3020 2898 2955 2906
R-squared 0.41 0.37 0.55 0.86 0.60 0.71
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
This table compares the response of selected bank-level variables to GDP growth and crisis/non-crisis periods for 
domestic and foreign banks. The regressions were computed with bank-level fixed effects and robust standard errors. 





Table 27. Asia, Regressions Using a Crisis Window 





Deposits Bank Spread Deposit Rate Lending Rate
Bank-level controls
Size 0.1270 0.2060 0.0780 -0.0080 0.0030 -0.0050
[0.035]*** [0.035]*** [0.118] [0.003]*** [0.002] [0.003]
Foreign*Size 0.1120 0.2010 0.4140 0.0080 -0.0020 0.0050
[0.051]** [0.052]*** [0.303] [0.005] [0.003] [0.007]
Liquidity (t-1) 0.7570 -0.0910 -1.7290 -0.0220 -0.0510 -0.0790
[0.145]*** [0.092] [0.609]*** [0.011]* [0.010]*** [0.013]***
Foreign*Liquidity (t-1) 0.2920 0.4940 -0.6090 0.0100 0.0230 0.0360
[0.233] [0.208]** [1.856] [0.059] [0.019] [0.073]
Capitalization (t-1) 0.8860 1.2560 0.3880 0.0270 0.0140 0.0430
[0.206]*** [0.211]*** [0.643] [0.031] [0.011] [0.030]
Foreign*Capitalization (t-1) 0.1720 0.2740 0.2290 0.0210 0.0220 0.0420
[0.402] [0.449] [0.831] [0.039] [0.021] [0.043]
Target variables
Dummy Crises -0.0920 -0.0440 0.0090 -0.0040 0.0230 0.0190
[0.019]*** [0.019]** [0.049] [0.001]** [0.002]*** [0.002]***
Foreign*Dummy Crises -0.0300 -0.1100 -0.3190 0.0020 -0.0050 -0.0030
[0.040] [0.039]*** [0.154]** [0.005] [0.003]* [0.006]
Constant 0.1250 0.1260 1.2440 0.0490 0.0680 0.1150
[0.008]*** [0.010]*** [0.040]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]***
Observations 3343 3327 3271 2956 3050 2965
R-squared 0.43 0.37 0.71 0.92 0.94 0.90
Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
This table compares the response of selected bank-level variables to GDP growth and crises/non-crises period across 
domestic and foreign banks. The regressions were computed with bank-level fixed effects and robust standard errors. 




Table 28. Latin America, Regressions Specifying Pre- and Post- Crisis Years 





Deposits Bank Spread Deposit Rate Lending Rate
Bank-level controls
Size 0.2330 0.2790 -0.3100 -0.0130 0.0100 0.0000
[0.040]*** [0.039]*** [0.187]* [0.004]*** [0.005]** [0.007]
Foreign*Size 0.0190 0.0560 0.1010 0.0000 -0.0090 -0.0130
[0.054] [0.053] [0.152] [0.006] [0.006] [0.009]
Liquidity (t-1) 0.6790 -0.0790 -1.6320 -0.0550 -0.0780 -0.0840
[0.154]*** [0.138] [0.781]** [0.019]*** [0.036]** [0.029]***
Foreign*Liquidity (t-1) 0.4030 0.0910 1.5070 0.1110 0.0410 0.1080
[0.223]* [0.217] [0.839]* [0.036]*** [0.042] [0.050]**
Capitalization (t-1) 1.2350 2.2250 -1.9140 -0.0010 0.0750 0.1150
[0.326]*** [0.322]*** [1.670] [0.035] [0.047] [0.059]*
Foreign*Capitalization (t-1) 0.8360 0.7750 2.3690 0.0530 -0.0350 -0.0220
[0.529] [0.523] [1.784] [0.066] [0.055] [0.089]
Target variables
Crises (T-1) 0.0690 0.0620 -0.1570 0.0240 -0.0060 0.0180
[0.066] [0.070] [0.110] [0.007]*** [0.006] [0.010]*
Foreign*Crises (T-1) 0.0850 0.1840 0.1480 -0.0080 -0.0100 -0.0180
[0.105] [0.108]* [0.133] [0.014] [0.011] [0.018]
Crises (T) -0.0730 -0.0730 -0.2820 0.0310 0.0150 0.0450
[0.069] [0.076] [0.138]** [0.007]*** [0.007]** [0.010]***
Foreign*Crises (T) 0.1120 0.0780 0.0990 -0.0220 -0.0050 -0.0270
[0.134] [0.150] [0.141] [0.015] [0.014] [0.019]
Crises (T+1) -0.1370 -0.2030 -0.3030 0.0290 0.0560 0.0720
[0.040]*** [0.039]*** [0.281] [0.007]*** [0.016]*** [0.011]***
Foreign*Crises (T+1) 0.1690 0.0680 0.0570 0.0070 -0.0480 -0.0320
[0.070]** [0.085] [0.371] [0.014] [0.019]** [0.021]
Constant 0.0190 0.0220 1.1850 0.0710 0.1220 0.1940
[0.014] [0.012]* [0.054]*** [0.002]*** [0.003]*** [0.002]***
Observations 3019 3055 3020 2898 2955 2906
R-squared 0.41 0.38 0.55 0.86 0.60 0.71
Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
This table compares the response of selected bank-level variables to GDP growth and crises/non-crises period across domestic and 





Table 29. Asia, Regressions Specifying Pre- and Post- Crisis Years 





Deposits Bank Spread Deposit Rate Lending Rate
Bank-level controls
Size 0.1240 0.2030 0.0830 -0.0090 0.0030 -0.0050
[0.035]*** [0.035]*** [0.118] [0.003]*** [0.002] [0.003]
Foreign*Size 0.1030 0.1940 0.4040 0.0080 -0.0040 0.0040
[0.050]** [0.052]*** [0.305] [0.005] [0.003] [0.007]
Liquidity (t-1) 0.8030 -0.0650 -1.7330 -0.0200 -0.0500 -0.0770
[0.146]*** [0.092] [0.612]*** [0.011]* [0.011]*** [0.013]***
Foreign*Liquidity (t-1) 0.3410 0.5500 -0.5260 0.0090 0.0210 0.0330
[0.231] [0.207]*** [1.838] [0.059] [0.019] [0.072]
Capitalization (t-1) 0.8020 1.2090 0.3610 0.0260 0.0080 0.0390
[0.204]*** [0.214]*** [0.648] [0.031] [0.012] [0.031]
Foreign*Capitalization (t-1) 0.1330 0.2240 0.2730 0.0190 0.0230 0.0380
[0.391] [0.446] [0.837] [0.039] [0.020] [0.044]
Target variables
Crises (T-1) 0.0380 0.0160 0.0470 0.0020 0.0010 0.0040
[0.011]*** [0.014] [0.034] [0.001]** [0.002] [0.001]***
Foreign*Crises (T-1) 0.0170 -0.0160 -0.1570 0.0000 0.0060 0.0040
[0.024] [0.029] [0.086]* [0.003] [0.002]** [0.004]
Crises (T) -0.0330 -0.0100 -0.0170 -0.0010 0.0180 0.0150
[0.013]** [0.015] [0.034] [0.001] [0.002]*** [0.001]***
Foreign*Crises (T) 0.0450 -0.0170 -0.1730 0.0010 -0.0030 0.0000
[0.032] [0.032] [0.103]* [0.004] [0.003] [0.005]
Crises (T+1) -0.1360 -0.0640 -0.0310 -0.0020 0.0110 0.0090
[0.016]*** [0.019]*** [0.032] [0.001] [0.002]*** [0.002]***
Foreign*Crises (T+1) -0.0540 -0.1270 -0.1100 -0.0020 -0.0030 -0.0060
[0.030]* [0.031]*** [0.074] [0.003] [0.002] [0.004]
Constant 0.1140 0.1180 1.2390 0.0480 0.0700 0.1160
[0.008]*** [0.009]*** [0.040]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]***
Observations 3343 3327 3271 2956 3050 2965
R-squared 0.45 0.38 0.71 0.92 0.94 0.90
Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
This table compares the response of selected bank-level variables to GDP growth and crises/non-crises period across 
domestic and foreign banks. The regressions were computed with bank-level fixed effects and robust standard errors. The 




Table 30. Latin America, Results with Alternative Definitions of Crises 





Deposits Bank Spread Deposit Rate Lending Rate
Caprio-Kinglebiel
Crises C-K (T-1) 0.006 -0.075 -0.267 0.025 0.000 0.026
[0.047] [0.045]* [0.127]** [0.006]*** [0.006] [0.009]***
Foreign*Crises C-K (T-1) -0.142 0.005 0.032 -0.024 -0.008 -0.033
[0.082]* [0.079] [0.135] [0.010]** [0.010] [0.012]***
Crises C-K (T) -0.101 -0.171 -0.350 0.045 0.045 0.081
[0.046]** [0.047]*** [0.282] [0.007]*** [0.012]*** [0.011]***
Foreign*Crises C-K (T) 0.136 0.123 0.019 0.000 -0.057 -0.051
[0.075]* [0.087] [0.326] [0.011] [0.015]*** [0.017]***
Crises C-K (T+1) 0.066 -0.005 -0.316 0.009 -0.008 0.013
[0.039]* [0.041] [0.275] [0.005]* [0.014] [0.009]
Foreign*Crises C-K (T+1) 0.123 0.042 -0.108 0.023 -0.014 -0.003
[0.077] [0.087] [0.410] [0.012]* [0.016] [0.017]
Frankel-Rose
Crises F-R (T-1) -0.029 0.157 0.141 0.002 -0.012 -0.006
[0.042] [0.051]*** [0.195] [0.006] [0.009] [0.011]
Foreign*Crises F-R (T-1) 0.034 0.006 0.254 -0.006 -0.005 -0.012
[0.101] [0.107] [0.465] [0.010] [0.013] [0.015]
Crises F-R (T) -0.226 -0.026 -0.205 0.011 0.036 0.046
[0.055]*** [0.060] [0.140] [0.006]* [0.009]*** [0.011]***
Foreign*Crises F-R (T) 0.184 0.073 0.738 0.009 -0.007 0.003
[0.100]* [0.111] [0.561] [0.012] [0.015] [0.020]
Crises F-R (T+1) -0.150 -0.110 0.126 0.009 0.043 0.056
[0.043]*** [0.042]*** [0.292] [0.007] [0.011]*** [0.013]***
Foreign*Crises F-R (T+1) 0.123 0.091 -0.028 0.005 0.035 0.038
[0.079] [0.083] [0.436] [0.015] [0.020]* [0.022]*
Kaminsky-Reinhart
Crises K-R (T-1) 0.016 0.010 -0.149 0.024 0.004 0.027
[0.057] [0.061] [0.103] [0.006]*** [0.005] [0.008]***
Foreign*Crises K-R (T-1) -0.033 0.091 0.046 -0.017 -0.009 -0.025
[0.089] [0.084] [0.121] [0.012] [0.007] [0.013]*
Crises K-R (T) -0.069 -0.069 -0.287 0.034 0.025 0.059
[0.069] [0.076] [0.141]** [0.007]*** [0.006]*** [0.010]***
Foreign*Crises K-R (T) 0.116 0.088 0.101 -0.023 -0.008 -0.031
[0.133] [0.149] [0.142] [0.016] [0.013] [0.017]*
Crises K-R (T+1) -0.147 -0.213 -0.302 0.029 0.059 0.074
[0.040]*** [0.039]*** [0.282] [0.007]*** [0.016]*** [0.011]***
Foreign*Crises K-R (T+1) 0.162 0.059 0.049 0.007 -0.049 -0.032
[0.071]** [0.086] [0.376] [0.015] [0.020]** [0.021]
This table reports selected coefficients from a set of 18 panel regressions that compare the behavior of bank loans, deposits, and 
interest rates, across domestic and foreign banks, around periods of financial crises. The sample covers 11 Latin American countries 
during 1989-2001. Each column covers 3 separate regressions that share the same dependent variable, described in the first row, and 
the same set of (unreported) bank-level controls: size, liquidity, and capitalization. Bank-level controls were lagged one period to 
reduce potential endogeneity problems. The reported coefficients correspond to a set of dummy variables, generically labeled as "T-
1", "T", and "T+1". Those labeled with "T" equal one during banking crises and zero elsewhere. Correspondingly, "T-1" equal one a 
year before financial crises and zero elsewhere, and "T+1" equal one a year after banking crises, and zero elsewhere. To provide 
sensitivity analysis, three alternative definitions of banking crises were used: Caprio-Kinglebiel, Frankel-Rose, and Kaminsky-
Reinhart. These are reported in the upper-, middle-, and lower-panel, respectively.
In order to compare the behavior of domestic and foreign banks, each explanatory variable was interacted with a "foreign bank" 
dummy. All regressions were computed with bank-level fixed effects and robust standard errors, reportes between square brackets. *, 
**, ***, indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.  
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Table 31. Asia, Results with Alternative Definitions of Crises 





Deposits Bank Spread Deposit Rate Lending Rate
Caprio-Kinglebiel
Crises C-K (T-1) 0.008 -0.021 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.008
[0.017] [0.021] [0.062] [0.002]** [0.002]* [0.002]***
Foreign*Crises C-K (T-1) -0.017 -0.065 -0.208 -0.004 0.011 0.006
[0.037] [0.050] [0.187] [0.006] [0.004]** [0.008]
Crises C-K (T) -0.095 -0.086 -0.083 0.004 0.018 0.021
[0.018]*** [0.016]*** [0.061] [0.002] [0.002]*** [0.002]***
Foreign*Crises C-K (T) -0.015 -0.071 -0.217 -0.007 0.005 -0.001
[0.048] [0.044] [0.177] [0.006] [0.004] [0.008]
Crises C-K (T+1) -0.15 -0.055 0.017 -0.008 0.005 -0.003
[0.024]*** [0.020]*** [0.101] [0.004]** [0.001]*** [0.004]
Foreign*Crises C-K (T+1) -0.159 -0.102 -0.391 -0.004 -0.005 -0.009
[0.057]*** [0.059]* [0.169]** [0.005] [0.003] [0.006]
Frankel-Rose
Crises F-R (T-1) 0.0230 -0.0260 0.0630 -0.0020 0.0050 0.0050
[0.023] [0.026] [0.096] [0.002] [0.002]*** [0.002]**
Foreign*Crises F-R (T-1) 0.0040 -0.0270 -0.7470 -0.0050 0.0030 -0.0040
[0.043] [0.065] [0.210]*** [0.006] [0.003] [0.008]
Crises F-R (T) -0.1950 -0.1580 -0.0080 -0.0160 0.0310 0.0140
[0.025]*** [0.028]*** [0.081] [0.002]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]***
Foreign*Crises F-R (T) -0.0460 -0.1180 -0.8810 0.0070 -0.0150 -0.0070
[0.048] [0.048]** [0.231]*** [0.005] [0.003]*** [0.006]
Crises F-R (T+1) -0.1840 -0.0990 -0.0950 -0.0130 0.0050 -0.0080
[0.038]*** [0.033]*** [0.060] [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.003]***
Foreign*Crises F-R (T+1) 0.0820 -0.0120 -0.7050 0.0180 -0.0030 0.0150
[0.054] [0.063] [0.454] [0.015] [0.004] [0.018]
Kaminsky-Reinhart
Crises K-R (T-1) 0.038 0.005 0.06 0.002 0.009 0.012
[0.020]* [0.024] [0.075] [0.001] [0.002]*** [0.002]***
Foreign*Crises K-R (T-1) 0.007 -0.033 -0.279 0.001 0.006 0.006
[0.041] [0.052] [0.189] [0.005] [0.004] [0.007]
Crises K-R (T) -0.122 -0.048 -0.049 -0.004 0.039 0.032
[0.027]*** [0.024]** [0.054] [0.002]* [0.004]*** [0.002]***
Foreign*Crises K-R (T) 0.066 -0.057 -0.315 0.004 -0.012 -0.005
[0.055] [0.050] [0.190]* [0.007] [0.005]** [0.008]
Crises K-R (T+1) -0.225 -0.106 0.028 -0.011 0.02 0.01
[0.035]*** [0.032]*** [0.058] [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]***
Foreign*Crises K-R (T+1) -0.115 -0.209 -0.339 0.003 -0.01 -0.008
[0.056]** [0.058]*** [0.155]** [0.005] [0.004]*** [0.006]
This table reports selected coefficients from a set of 18 panel regressions that compare the behavior of bank loans, deposits, and 
interest rates, across domestic and foreign banks, around periods of financial crises. The sample covers 9 Asian countries during 1989-
2001. Each column covers 3 separate regressions that share the same dependent variable, described in the first row, and the same set 
of (unreported) bank-level controls: size, liquidity, and capitalization. Bank-level controls were lagged one period to reduce potential 
endogeneity problems. The reported coefficients correspond to a set of dummy variables, generically labeled as "T-1", "T", and 
"T+1". Those labeled with "T" equal one during banking crises and zero elsewhere. Correspondingly, "T-1" equal one a year before 
financial crises and zero elsewhere, and "T+1" equal one a year after banking crises, and zero elsewhere. To provide sensitivity 
analysis, three alternative definitions of banking crises were used: Caprio-Kinglebiel, Frankel-Rose, and Kaminsky-Reinhart. These 
are reported in the upper-, middle-, and lower-panel, respectively.
In order to compare the behavior of domestic and foreign banks, each explanatory variable was interacted with a "foreign bank" 
dummy. All regressions were computed with bank-level fixed effects and robust standard errors, reportes between square brackets. *, 
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